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Preface
The recent financial crisis highlights the importance of unwarranted expectations and their
abrupt correction for fluctuations in economic activity. In the run-up to the crisis, con-
sumers, creditors, and professional investors’ were overly optimistic about the U.S. housing
market, credit ratings, and structured mortgage products (Brunnermeier 2009). However,
this optimism proved to be unwarranted.
The first chapter of this dissertation more generally asks to what extent changes of
expectations are an autonomous source of business cycle fluctuations. This question dates
back to Pigou (1927), who discusses the possibility that “errors of undue optimism or undue
pessimism” are a genuine cause of “industrial fluctuations”. As another source, Pigou
identifies “autonomous monetary causes”, which he relates to shifts in monetary or banking
policies. In the case of the recent financial crisis, both are evident. During its course, banks
came under distress and reduced their lending to the real economy, suppressing investment.
However, disentangling supply from demand driven credit contractions is challenging (see,
for instance, Bernanke and Gertler 1995, Oliner and Rudebusch 1996, and Peek, Rosengren,
and Tootell 2003). The second and third chapter of this thesis take aim at this question.
Chapter 2 elaborates on the measurement of financial constraints and Chapter 3 studies
the empirical identification of supply driven restrictions to bank lending.
In Chapter 1, we assess the contribution of “undue optimism”, as noted by Pigou
(1927), to short-run fluctuations. More recently, Beaudry and Portier (2004) explore the
possibility of “Pigou cycles” in a quantitative business cycle model featuring possibly undue
expectations regarding future productivity. Lorenzoni (2009), in turn, puts forward a
model in which misperceptions regarding the current state of productivity turn out to be
an important source of business cycle fluctuations.
In this chapter, we take up the issue empirically and investigate the contribution of
undue optimism and pessimism to business cycles fluctuations. Estimating a vector au-
toregression (VAR) on U.S. time-series data, we seek to identify “optimism shocks”, that
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is, changes in expectations due to a perceived change in total factor productivity which
does not actually materialize. Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013) show that this
constitutes a formidable challenge, because optimism shocks or, quite generally, mispercep-
tions are mistakes of market participants. As such they cannot be uncovered on the basis
of standard time-series techniques. Instead, one may resort to estimating fully specified
general equilibrium models (Barsky and Sims 2012) or exploit information not available to
market participants in real time.
Our analysis is based on this insight. Specifically, our identification strategy relies on
an ex-post measure of agents’ misperceptions, namely the nowcast error regarding current
output growth. Drawing on the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), we compute it
as the difference between actual output growth in a given quarter and the median of the
predicted values in real time. A positive realization of the nowcast error thus implies that
nowcasts have been too pessimistic. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that, as
a reduced-form measure, nowcast errors may be the result not only of optimism shocks,
but of various structural innovations.
Nowcast errors play a key role in our analysis as they allow us to recover optimism shocks
from actual time series data. We establish this result within a business cycle model which
mimics, in a stylized way, the informational friction which gives rise to nowcast errors. The
model is a version of the dispersed-information model of Lorenzoni (2009), for which we
are able to obtain closed-form solutions. Using the model, we also derive the identification
restrictions on which we rely in the main part of our analysis. Specifically, drawing on
earlier work by Gal´ı (1999) and others, we estimate a VAR model on time-series data for
labor productivity, employment, and the nowcast error. In order to identify the distinct
contributions of optimism and productivity shocks to short-run fluctuations, we assume,
in line with our theoretical results, that nowcast errors may emerge only as a result of
optimism or productivity shocks. Yet optimism shocks, in contrast to productivity shocks,
have no bearing on labor productivity in the long run.
According to the estimated VAR model, optimism shocks—as predicted by theory—
induce a negative nowcast error, yet significantly boost economic activity at the same time.
This result is noteworthy, because we do not restrict the response of the nowcast error to
optimism shocks. Moreover, as the unconditional correlation between nowcast errors and
economic activity is positive, the change of the correlation conditional on optimism shocks
lends additional support to our identification strategy. Instead, productivity shocks induce
a positive nowcast error while also stimulating economic activity. These results are robust
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across a range of alternative specifications, including alternative measures of the nowcast
error. Finally, computing a forecast error variance decomposition, we find that optimism
shocks account for up to 30 percent of output fluctuations.
Turning to Pigou’s (1927) “autonomous monetary causes” of industrial fluctuations,
Chapter 2 studies the measurement of financial constraints. The analysis of financial-
market imperfections and their impact on firms’ investment decisions occupies a prominent
place in macroeconomics and corporate finance (Hubbard 1998). The measurement of
financial constraints is key for the empirical strand of this research and the literature has
suggested a variety of indices and sorting criteria based on firm characteristics. However,
there is considerable debate about their relative merits.
Fazzari and Petersen (1988) constitute investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure
of financial constraints and motivate a large subsequent literature. However, Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) call the findings of this literature into question. Examining the annual
reports and 10-K filings of the sub-sample of firms, which Fazzari and Petersen (1988)
identify as most financially constrained, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find arguably less
financially constrained firms to show significantly greater sensitivities. Subsequently, Lam-
ont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) introduce the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index utilizing
their sample and classification scheme. However, there is still considerable debate on the
correct measurement of financial constraints (see, for instance, Cleary 2006, Whited and
Wu 2006, and Hadlock and Pierce 2010).
We add to this debate by evaluating the KZ index as well as two more recently suggested
alternatives, the Whited & Wu (WW) and the Size & Age (SA) index. Following the
approach of Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we explain firms’ qualitative assessments of their
financing conditions by the quantitative variables employed by the indices. Subsequently,
we infer from the signs and the significance levels of the regression coefficients as well
as from the overall model fit on the appropriateness of the tested indicators to measure
financial constraints. Moreover, we study the sensitivity of our estimates with respect to
non-linear variable transformations based on fractional polynomials.
However, the value of our exercise emerges from the data. We employ a survey-based
measure of financial constraints obtained from a sample of German manufacturing firms
running from 1989 to 2009. This measure is not subject to the endogeneity critique put
forward by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), who find the same information used to construct
both, the dependent variable as well as the explanatory variables comprising the KZ index.
In addition, we utilize survey-based assessments of firms sales expectations as well as of the
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profitability of the investment projects they face. Thus, we control for firms investment
opportunities without relying on measures of q.
Despite the warranted criticism, we provide evidence that the KZ index is a valid mea-
sure of financial constraints. Our results are particularly striking given the narrow focus of
the original KZ sample. For the WW and the SA index, however, evidence is mixed. Al-
though we find the WW index to significantly outperform a random classification scheme,
coefficient estimates for the comprised indicators are not in line with the original load-
ings. In particular, the industry sales growth variable, which loads positively on the index,
is significantly negatively associated with our qualitative financial constraints indicator.
Yet, Whited and Wu (2006) employ the variable in order to capture the availability of
attractive investment opportunities (high industry sales growth), which are supposed to
be positively associated with (binding) financial constraints. Moreover, for the SA index,
we reject the hypothesis of external validity. Specifically, the index fails to outperform a
random classification algorithm in identifying financially constrained firms. This result is
relevant given that the authors claim the SA index to be a reasonable choice for measuring
financial constraints in many contexts after having extensively studied its robustness and
out of sample performance.
The final Chapter studies the impact of financial constraints on bank dependent firms.
From a policy perspective, the effectiveness and efficiency of any policy response towards
recessions and credit slumps crucially depends on the understanding of the extent to
which credit market outcomes are driven by supply-side or demand-side factors. If under-
capitalized banks are a burden on the economy, government intervention may well be
justified. However, if on the contrary growth is hampered by firm-side factors (e.g. by
subdued expectations or low creditworthiness) and credit volumes go down in response to
weak credit demand or higher default risk, government interventions should not necessarily
aim at banks.
The empirical analysis of the effects of supply-driven changes in bank lending restrictions
on real economic activity is complicated by the need to rule out demand-side factors.
On the firm-level, the existing literature primarily does so based on firms’ balance sheet
information. Balance sheets, however, are published on a low frequency and are backward-
looking in nature. In particular, they contain little information on firms’ expectations. In
this study, we observe firms’ self-perceived bank lending restrictions on an almost monthly
frequency and ask the question of whether controlling for similarly high-frequent survey-
based indicators of firms current states and future prospects in addition to balance sheet
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information impacts the inference on the identified treatment effects.
We employ a panel data of German manufacturing firms in which bank lending restric-
tions are mainly driven by the 2007/08 financial crisis. At the beginning of our analysis,
we estimate the effect of restrictive bank lending on firm-level employment growth using
a matching estimator based on balance sheet variables only. The results suggest a signif-
icant supply-driven effect of bank lending restrictions on firm-level employment growth.
However, this effect is not confirmed once we control for survey-based appraisals of firms’
current business situations and future expectations. Specifically, treatment effects turn
out to be significantly lower while balancing properties improve considerably. In contrast,
balancing properties are poor in the case of matching on balance sheet variables only, re-
vealing significant bias from unbalanced contemporaneous and forward-looking firm-specific
indicators. Finally, robustness exercises confirm that our results hold irrespective of the
matching algorithm or the adjustment of extreme values in employment growth rates and
balance sheet variables.
Our findings indicate that estimates of firm-level effects of bank lending restrictions
are sensitive to the incorporation of contemporaneous and forward-looking information on
firms’ credit demand. Indeed, their omission may cause considerable bias. For this reason,
our results ask researchers to cautiously infer on the effects of bank lending restrictions if
they rely on balance sheet information only.
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Chapter 1
Growth expectations, undue
optimism, and short-run fluctuations
We assess the contribution of “undue optimism” (Pigou) to short-run fluctuations. In our
analysis, optimism pertains to total factor productivity which determines economic activity
in the long run, but is not contemporaneously observed by market participants. In order
to recover optimism shocks—autonomous, but fundamentally unwarranted changes in the
assessment of productivity—from actual time series, we rely on an informational advantage
over market participants. Specifically, we compute the nowcast error regarding current
output growth drawing on the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Including nowcast errors
in a vector autoregression model makes it possible to identify optimism shocks. Optimism
shocks, in line with theory, induce a negative nowcast error but raise economic activity in
the short run. They account for up to 30 percent of short-run fluctuations.
1.1 Introduction
Economic outcomes depend on expectations and vice versa. In this paper, we ask to what
extent changes of expectations are an autonomous source of business cycle fluctuations.
This question dates back to Pigou (1927) who discusses the possibility that “errors of undue
optimism or undue pessimism” are a genuine cause of “industrial fluctuations.” Keynes’
notion of “animal spirits” is a related, but distinct concept.1 More recently, Beaudry and
1 Keynes’ animal spirits are “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction”, which drive economic
decisions beyond considerations based “on nothing but a mathematical expectation” (Keynes 1936, pp.
161 and 162).
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Portier (2004) explore the possibility of “Pigou cycles” in a quantitative business cycle
model featuring possibly undue expectations regarding future productivity. Lorenzoni
(2009), in turn, puts forward a model in which misperceptions regarding the current state
of productivity turn out to be an important source of business cycle fluctuations.
In this paper, we take up the issue empirically and investigate the contribution of undue
optimism and pessimism to business cycles fluctuations. Estimating a vector autoregression
(VAR) on U.S. time-series data, we seek to identify “optimism shocks”, that is, changes
in expectations due to a perceived change in total factor productivity which does not ac-
tually materialize. Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013) show that this constitutes
a formidable challenge, because optimism shocks or, quite generally, misperceptions are
mistakes of market participants. As such they cannot be uncovered on the basis of stan-
dard time-series techniques. Instead, one may resort to estimating fully specified general
equilibrium models (Barsky and Sims 2012) or exploit information not available to market
participants in real time.
Our analysis is based on this insight. Specifically, our identification strategy relies on
an ex-post measure of agents’ misperceptions, namely the nowcast error regarding current
output growth. Drawing on the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), we compute
it as the difference between actual output growth in a given quarter and the median of
the predicted values in real time. A positive realization of the nowcast error thus implies
that nowcasts have been too pessimistic. Yet it is important to keep in mind that, as a
reduced-form measure, nowcast errors may be the result not only of optimism shocks, but
of various structural innovations.
The SPF is a widely recognized measure of private sector expectations regarding the
current state and prospects of the U.S. economy. It is also a frequently used benchmark to
assess forecasting models. Nevertheless, as we show in the first step of our analysis, nowcast
errors can be sizable. Depending on whether we consider the first or the final release of
data for actual output growth, the largest nowcast error exceeds 1 or 1.75 percentage
points of quarterly output growth respectively. We also document that nowcast errors
are positively correlated with economic activity and investigate the effect of well-known
measures of structural innovations on nowcast errors. We find that innovations which are
publicly observable, such as monetary and fiscal policy shocks or uncertainty shocks, do not
cause nowcast errors. In contrast, productivity shocks have a significant effect on nowcast
errors, presumably because they impact current output growth, but are not observable in
real time.
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Nowcast errors play a key role in our analysis as they allow us to recover optimism shocks
from actual time series data. We establish this result within a business cycle model which
mimics, in a stylized way, the informational friction which gives rise to nowcast errors. The
model is a version of the dispersed-information model of Lorenzoni (2009), for which we
are able to obtain closed-form solutions. Using the model, we also derive the identification
restrictions on which we rely in the main part of our analysis. Specifically, drawing on
earlier work by Gal´ı (1999) and others, we estimate a VAR model on time-series data for
labor productivity, employment, and the nowcast error. In order to identify the distinct
contributions of optimism and productivity shocks to short-run fluctuations, we assume,
in line with our theoretical results, that nowcast errors may emerge only as a result of
optimism or productivity shocks. Yet optimism shocks, in contrast to productivity shocks,
have no bearing on labor productivity in the long run.
According to the estimated VAR model, optimism shocks—as predicted by theory—
induce a negative nowcast error, yet significantly boost economic activity at the same time.
This result is noteworthy, because we do not restrict the response of the nowcast error to
optimism shocks. Moreover, as the unconditional correlation between nowcast errors and
economic activity is positive, the change of the correlation conditional on optimism shocks
lends additional support to our identification strategy. Instead, productivity shocks induce
a positive nowcast error while also stimulating economic activity. These results are robust
across a range of alternative specifications, including alternative measures of the nowcast
error. Finally, computing a forecast error variance decomposition, we find that optimism
shocks account for up to 30 percent of output fluctuations.
Conceptually, our analysis relates to a number of recent studies on the role of exoge-
nous shifts in expectations as a source of business cycle fluctuations. Angeletos and La’O
(2013) develop a model where “sentiment shocks” arise, as market participants are unduly
but simultaneously optimistic about their terms of trade. These shocks trigger aggregate
fluctuations even if productivity is known to be constant. A number of contributions have
focused on the distinction between current and anticipated productivity shocks. Evidence
by Beaudry and Portier (2006) suggests that business cycles are largely driven by expected
future changes in productivity (see also Beaudry, Nam, and Wang 2011, Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe 2012, and Leduc and Sill 2013), while Barsky and Sims (2011) find the role of
expected productivity innovations to be limited. In any case, to the extent that anticipated
shocks do not materialize as expected, a recession might ensue, which is thus caused by
undue optimism (Jaimovic and Rebelo 2009). In our analysis, we allow misperceptions to
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pertain also to current, instead of only to future productivity.
We also stress that there are few attempts to identify optimism shocks empirically
without imposing a fully structural model on the data. Blanchard (1993) provides an
animal-spirits account of the 1990–91 recession focusing on consumption. Caroll, Fuhrer,
and Wilcox (1994) show that consumer sentiment forecasts consumption spending—aside
from the information contained in other available indicators. Yet in concluding they sug-
gest a “fundamental explanation” based on habits and precautionary saving motives. Oh
and Waldman (1990) show that “false macroeconomic announcements”, identified as mea-
surement error in early releases of leading indicators, cause future economic activity. They
refrain from a structural interpretation, however. Mora and Schulstad (2007) show that
once announcements regarding current growth are taken into account, the actual growth
rate has no predictive power in determining future growth. Finally, Bachmann and Sims
(2012) explore the importance of confidence for the transmission of fiscal shocks, but do
not analyze the effect of exogenous variations in confidence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces our
measure of nowcast errors and provides a number of statistics illustrating their properties.
Section 3 puts forward a simple model which allows us to clarify issues pertaining to the
notion of optimism shocks and their identification. Section 4 presents our VAR model and
results. A final section concludes.
1.2 A reduced-form measure of misperceptions
We eventually aim to uncover the effects of optimism shocks, that is, a perceived change
in productivity which does not actually materialize. In this section, as a step towards this
end, we consider a reduced-form measure of misperceptions by computing nowcast errors
regarding current U.S. output growth. Nowcast errors can be the result of optimism shocks,
but they may also be due to other structural innovations. Still, nowcast errors will play a
key role in our identification strategy in Section 1.4 below. In what follows, we therefore
describe the construction of nowcast errors and compute a number of statistics in order to
illustrate their scope, possible causes, and their relation to economic activity.
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1.2.1 Data
Our main data source is the SPF, initiated by the American Statistical Association and
the NBER in 1968Q4, now maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.2
The survey is conducted at quarterly frequency. Panelists receive the questionnaires at
the end of the first month of the quarter and have to submit their answers by the 2nd
to 3rd week of the following month. The results of the survey are released immediately
afterwards. At this stage, no information regarding current output is available from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). At most, in order to nowcast output growth for the
current quarter, forecasters may draw on the NIPA advance report regarding output in the
previous quarter.
Predicted quarterly output growth is annualized and measured in real terms. Note that
initially, within the SPF, output is measured by GNP, later by GDP. We compute nowcast
errors by subtracting the survey’s median forecast from the actual value reported later
by the BEA.3 We compute two measures of nowcast errors by distinguishing between the
first and the final data release for actual output growth.4 For the latter, we use the latest
available data vintage. We thereby address concerns that the assessment of nowcasts or,
more generally, forecasts depends on what is being used as the “actual” or realization (see,
e.g., Stark and Croushore 2002).5
1.2.2 Nowcast errors
We compute nowcast errors as the difference between actual output growth in a given
quarter and the median value of the predicted value. They are shown in the left panel of
2Professional forecasters are mostly private, financial-sector firms. The number of participating institu-
tions declined from 50 to fewer than 20 in 1988. After the Philadelphia Fed took over in 1990, participation
rose again; see Croushore (1993). Regarding our latest observation in 2012Q4, 39 forecasters participated
in the survey.
3For the SPF forecasts of GNP/GDP we use the series DRGDP2, which we obtain from the Real-time
Data Research Center of the Philadelphia Fed. This series corresponds to the median forecast of the
quarterly growth rate of real output, seasonally adjusted at annual rate (real GNP prior to 1992 and real
GDP afterwards). Also note that prior to 1981Q3 the SPF asks for nominal GNP only. In this case, the
forecast for the price index of GNP is applied to obtain the implied forecast for real GNP.
4Data are obtained from BEA and the Philadelphia Fed’s Real-time Data Set for Macroeconomists.
First-release data: BEA’s first (advance) estimate of the quarterly growth rate of real GNP/GDP (season-
ally adjusted at annual rate, with real GNP prior to 1992 and real GDP for 1992-present): ROUTPUT.
Final-release data: series GNPC96 and GDPC96 which are quarterly Gross National/Domestic Product,
seasonally adjusted at annual rates, chained 2005 Dollars.
5In fact, the authors consider a set of alternative definitions of actuals and find statistically signifi-
cant differences of forecast evaluations for real output. We show below, however, that our results hold
independently of the choice of first- or final-release data.
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Figure 1.1: Nowcast error
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Notes: Left panel: series based on first-release data (solid) and final-release data (dashed). Errors are
measured in annualized percentage points (vertical axis). Right panel: cumulative impulse response of
output growth to nowcast error based on local projections. Horizontal axis measures quarters, vertical
axis measures percentage deviation of output from the average-growth path. Dashed lines indicate 90
percent confidence bounds implied by Newey-West standard errors.
Figure 1.1, measured in annualized percentage points. The solid (dashed) line represents
results based on first-release (final-release) data. Although the two series co-move strongly
(correlation: 0.55), there are perceptible differences. For instance, there are sizable neg-
ative errors in the second half of 2008 only for the measure based on final-release data.
Presumably, at the beginning of the great recession the actual growth slowdown was larger
not only relative to what professional forecasters predicted in real time, but also relative
to what initial data suggested. Moreover, errors based on first-release data are shifted
downwards relative to those based on final-release data, notably in the first half of the
sample.
This is confirmed by the summary statistics reported in Table 1.1: the mean of the
nowcast errors is significantly positive if we consider final-release data, but not significantly
different from zero in the case of first-release data. The standard error and the largest
realizations of the nowcast error are also considerably larger in the case of final-release
data.6 The difference is likely due to the revision process of the statistical office and
particularly to benchmark revisions. We therefore rely on first-release data in our baseline
6This finding is consistent with evidence provided by Faust, Rogers, and Wright (2005) regarding GDP
announcements. For G7 countries it turns out that revisions of initial announcements are significantly
positive on average in their sample period. Note, however, that the mean of final-release nowcast errors
becomes insignificant once we control for productivity shocks below.
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VAR model in section 1.4, and consider final-release data in our sensitivity analysis. Finally,
the last two columns of Table 1.1 report results of a Ljung–Box test, suggesting that there
is no serial correlation in both series.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics nowcast errors
Ljung–Box test
N Mean SD Min Max Q-stat. p-value
Final-release based 177 .35** 2.36 -6.38 7.49 2.59 .96
First-release based 177 .04 1.86 -5.31 5.43 8.68 .37
Notes: Nowcast errors computed on the basis of final-release (top row) and first-release (bottom row)
data, measured in annualized percentage points; sample: 1968Q4 - 2012Q4. Means are tested against
zero based on a standard t-test. ‘**’ indicates significance at the 5% level. The last two columns report
Q-statistics and p-values for a Ljung-Box test assessing the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelations up
to 8 lags.
What causes nowcast errors? Assuming that the average forecaster has a correct un-
derstanding of the economy, structural innovations that are public information should not
induce systematic forecast errors. On the other hand, structural innovations that are
not directly observable may generate nowcast errors. To assess this hypothesis, we run
regressions of nowcast errors on popular (and relatively uncontroversial) series of struc-
tural innovations. Specifically, we consider monetary policy shocks identified by Romer
and Romer (2004), tax shocks identified by Romer and Romer (2010), uncertainty shocks
identified by Bloom (2009), and productivity shocks provided by Fernald (2012).7
In each instance, we regress nowcast errors on the contemporaneous realization of the
structural shock, while also including four lags of the nowcast error in the regression model.
The sample varies across regressions, since we use the longest overlapping sample in each
case. Results for the impact effect are reported in Table 1.2. Newey-West standard errors
7Following Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006), Fernald constructs a utilization-adjusted series of TFP
at quarterly frequency. In terms of actual series we use the “utilization-adjusted TFP in producing non-
equipment output” (dtfp C util) of Fernald (2012). For the uncertainty shocks we rely on the quarterly
average of the monthly series of stock-market volatility shocks identified in the baseline VAR of Bloom
(2009). In the case of monetary and tax shocks we use the quarterly average of the monthly shock series
(RESID) and the “sum of Deficit-Driven and Long-Run Tax Changes” (EXOGENRRATIO) of Romer and
Romer (2004) and Romer and Romer (2010) respectively.
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are reported in parentheses. The top row reports results based on the final-release data,
the bottom row is based on the first-release data. We find that for monetary and fiscal
policy innovations, as well as for uncertainty shocks, there is indeed no significant impact
on nowcast errors, in line with the hypothesis that the effect of observable innovations is
relatively well understood by forecasters. Instead, it is productivity innovations that have a
significant impact. Specifically, positive productivity innovations tend to raise the nowcast
error contemporaneously, that is, they tend to raise the growth of economic activity beyond
the expected level.
Table 1.2: Nowcast errors and structural innovations to...
Monetary Policy Taxes Uncertainty Productivity
1969:1 - 1996:4 1968:4 - 2007:4 1963:3 - 2008:2 1968:4 - 2009:3
Final-release based 1.678 -.002 .451 .480***
(1.044) (1.144) (.435) (.049)
First-release based 1.611 -.730 .088 .140***
(.978) (.963) (.260) (.045)
Notes: Impact effect on nowcast error obtained from regressing the nowcast error on the time series for
the structural innovations to monetary policy, fiscal policy (taxes), uncertainty, and productivity. The
regression includes four lags of the nowcast error. Newey-West standard errors robust for autocorrelation
up to four lags are reported in parentheses; time series of structural innovations to monetary policy, taxes,
uncertainty, and productivity provided by Romer and Romer (2004), Romer and Romer (2010), Bloom
(2009), and Fernald (2012) respectively.
1.2.3 Nowcast errors and economic activity
Nowcast errors are positive surprises regarding current activity. They are also positively
correlated with output growth.8 To explore systematically how current nowcast errors
relate to economic activity, we estimate the dynamic relationship on the basis of local
projections (see Jorda` 2005). In particular, we relate current and future output growth to
8The correlation between GDP growth (final-release data) and the nowcast error is .73 and .47 for the
final-release and first-release measure respectively.
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current nowcast errors.9
The right panel of Figure 1.1 shows the cumulative impulse response of output growth
to a nowcast error. The horizontal axis measures quarters, the vertical axis percentage
deviation of output from the constant-growth path. Dashed lines indicate 90 percent
confidence bounds implied by Newey-West standard errors. We find that nowcast errors
predict a strong, mildly hump-shaped increase of economic activity. The effect is stronger
for our measure based on the final-release data, yet differences are moderate relative to
the one based on first-release data. The finding that (reduced-form) nowcast errors predict
future activity is noteworthy in light of the results regarding effects of optimism shocks
documented in Section 1.4 below. Before discussing this evidence, we provide a theoretical
rationale for our empirical framework in the following section.
1.3 The model
In this section we put forward a model which allows us to formally define optimism shocks,
discuss conditions under which they may affect economic activity and, importantly, clarify
issues pertaining to identification. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) find that models of
information rigidities in general, and of noisy information in particular, are successful in
predicting empirical regularities of survey data on expectations. Our model thus builds
on the noisy and dispersed information model of Lorenzoni (2009), a key feature of which
is that agents do not observe current output. As our goal is to derive robust qualitative
predictions, we simplify the original model, notably by assuming predetermined rather
than staggered prices. As a result, it is possible to solve an approximate model in closed
form.
1.3.1 Setup and timing
There is a continuum of islands (or locations), indexed by l ∈ [0, 1], each populated by
a representative household and a unit mass of producers, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each
household buys from a subset of all islands, chosen randomly in each period. Specifically, it
buys from all producers on n islands included in the set Bl,t, with 1 < n <∞.10 Households
9To capture potential serial correlation, we apply Newey-West standard errors. The error structure is
assumed to be possibly heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to lag 4. We also include four lags of GDP
growth in the regression.
10This setup ensures that households cannot infer aggregate productivity exactly from observed prices.
At the same time, individual producers have no impact on the price of households’ consumption baskets.
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have an infinite planning horizon. Producers produce differentiated products on the basis
of an island-specific productivity, which is determined by a permanent, economy-wide
component and a temporary, idiosyncratic component. Both components are stochastic.
Financial markets are complete such that, assuming identical initial positions, wealth levels
of households are equalized at the beginning of each period.
The timing of events is as follows: Each period consists of three stages. During stage
one of period t, information about all variables of period t−1 is released. Subsequently,
nominal wages are determined. Finally, the central bank sets the interest rate based on
expected inflation.
Shocks realize during the second stage. We distinguish between shocks which are directly
observable and shocks which are not. Optimism and productivity shocks fall in the latter
category. In particular, information about idiosyncratic productivity is private to each
producer. Additionally, all agents observe a signal about average productivity. While the
signal is unbiased, it contains an i.i.d. zero-mean component: the optimism shock.11 In
terms of observable shocks, we allow for monetary policy shocks. Yet, rather than being
interested in the effects of monetary policy shocks per se, we merely aim at contrasting
the effects of observable shocks on nowcast errors to those of non-observable shocks. Given
these information sets, producers set prices.
During the third and final stage, households split up. Workers work for all firms on
their island, while consumers allocate their expenditures across differentiated goods based
on public information, including the signal, and information contained in the prices of
the goods in their consumption bundle. Because the common productivity component is
permanent and households’ wealth and information is equalized in the next period, agents
expect the economy to settle on a new steady state from period t+1 onwards.
1.3.2 Households
A representative household on island l maximizes lifetime utility given by
Ul,t = El,t
∞∑
k=t
βk−t lnCl,t −
L1+ϕl,t
1 + ϕ
ϕ ≥ 0, 0 < β < 1,
with El,t being the expectation operator based on household l’s information set at the time
of its consumption decision (see below). Cl,t denotes the consumption basket of household
11We refer to this signal component throughout as an “optimism shock” with the understanding that
realizations may be positive (optimism shock) or negative (pessimism shocks).
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l, while Ll,t is its labor supply. The flow budget constraint is given by
Et(%l,t,t+1Al,t)+Bl,t+
∑
m∈Bl,t
∫ 1
0
Pj,m,l,tCj,m,l,tdj ≤
∫ 1
0
Πj,l,tdj+Wl,tLl,t+Al,t−1+(1+rt−1)Bl,t−1,
where Cj,m,l,t denotes the amount bought by household l from producer j on island m
and Pj,m,l,t is the price for one unit of Cj,m,l,t. Πj,l,t are profits of firm j on island l and
%l,t,t+1 is household l’s stochastic discount factor between t and t+1. At the beginning
of the period, the household receives a payoff Al,t−1 from its portfolio of state-contingent
securities, purchased in the previous period. Bl,t are state non-contingent bonds paying an
interest rate of rt. A complete set of state-contingent securities is traded at the beginning of
the period, while state non-contingent bonds can be traded via the central bank throughout
the entire period.12 The interest rate of the non-contingent bond is set by the central bank.
All financial assets are in zero net supply. The bundle Cl,t of goods purchased by household
l consists of goods sold in a subset of all islands in the economy
Cl,t =
 1
n
∑
m∈Bl,t
∫ 1
0
C
γ−1
γ
j,m,l,tdj

γ
γ−1
γ > 1.
While each household purchases a different random set of goods, we assume that the
amount n of goods is the same for all households. The price index of household l is
Pl,t =
 1
n
∑
m∈Bl,t
∫ 1
0
P 1−γj,m,l,tdj
 11−γ .
1.3.3 Producers and monetary policy
The central bank follows a standard Taylor rule but sets the net interest rate rt before
observing prices, that is during stage one of period t:
rt = ψEcb,tpit + θt ψ > 1,
where pit is economy-wide net inflation, calculated on the basis of all goods sold in the
economy. The expectation operator Ecb,t conditions on the information set of the central
12As a result, households cannot extract additional information about aggregate variables from the prices
of the securities.
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bank, which consists of information from period t− 1 only.13
θt is a monetary policy shock that is observable by producers and households alike.
Producer j on island l produces according to the following production function
Yj,l,t = Aj,l,tL
α
j,l,t 0 < α < 1,
featuring labor supplied by the local household as the sole input. Aj,l,t = Al,t denotes the
productivity level of producer j, which is the same for all producers on island l. During
stage two, the producer sets her optimal price for the current period based on a combination
of private and public information (see below). Given prices, the level of production is
determined by demand during stage three.
1.3.4 Productivity and signal
Log-productivity on each island, denoted by small-case letters, is the sum of an aggregate
and an island-specific idiosyncratic component
al,t = xt + ηl,t,
where ηl,t is an i.i.d. shock with variance σ
2
η and mean zero. It aggregates to zero across
all islands. The aggregate component xt follows a random walk
∆xt = εt.
The i.i.d. productivity shock εt has variance σ
2
ε and mean zero. During stage two of each
period, agents observe a public signal about xt. This signal takes the form
st = εt + et,
where et is an i.i.d. optimism shock with variance σ
2
e and mean zero. Producers also observe
their own productivity. Hence, their expectations of ∆xt are
Ej,l,t∆xt = ρ
p
xst + δ
p
x(aj,l,t − xt−1),
13Pre-set prices and interest rates allow us to discard the noisy signals about quantities and inflation
observed by producers and the central bank in Lorenzoni (2009), simplifying the signal-extraction setup
without changing its qualitative predictions. Pre-set wages, on the other hand, guarantee determinacy of
the price level. They do not affect output dynamics after optimism and productivity shocks, because good
prices may still adjust.
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with Ej,l,t being the expectation of producer j on island l when setting prices (stage two).
The coefficients ρpx and δ
p
x are the same for all producers, where these and the following ρ and
δ-coefficients are functions of the structural parameters which capture the informational
friction. They are non-negative and smaller than unity (see Appendix 1.A). Finally, while
shopping during stage three consumers observe a set of prices. Given that they have also
observed the signal, they can infer the productivity level of each producer in their sample
from her price. Consumers’ expectations are thus given by
El,t∆xt = ρ
h
xst + δ
h
x a˜l,t,
where a˜l,t is the average over the realizations of am,t−xt−1 for each island m in household l’s
sample. ρhx and δ
h
x are equal across households and depend on n, σ
2
e , σ
2
ε , and σ
2
η. The model
nests the case of complete information about all relevant variables for households and pro-
ducers if σ2e = 0. If σ
2
e > 0, producers will set prices based on potentially overly optimistic
or pessimistic expectations of productivity. Consumers also have complete information if
n→∞.
1.3.5 Market clearing
Good and labor markets clear in each period:∫ 1
0
Cj,m,l,tdl = Yj,m,t ∀j,m Ll,t =
∫ 1
0
Lj,l,tdj ∀l,
where Cj,m,l,t = 0 if households l does not visit island m. The asset market clears by
Walras’ law.
1.3.6 Results
We derive a solution of the model based on a linear approximation to the equilibrium
conditions around the symmetric steady state, see Appendix 1.A for details. We obtain
the following propositions, for which we provide proofs in Appendix 1.B.
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Proposition 1 A positive optimism shock (et > 0), a positive productivity shock (εt > 0),
and a negative monetary policy shock (θt < 0) raise output. Formally, we have
yt = xt−1 + ρhx(1− Ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
et +
[
(δhx + ρ
h
x)(1− Ω) + Ω
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
εt− α
α + ψ(1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
θ,
with 0 < Ω = n−δ
h
x(1−α)[(n−1)δpx+1]
nα+(1−α){(1−δhx)[1+δpx(n−1)]+(n−1)γ(1−δpx)} < 1.
Proposition 2 A positive optimism shock induces a negative nowcast error, while a pos-
itive productivity shock induces a positive nowcast error. This holds for nowcast errors of
producers and households alike. Formally,
yt − Ek,tyt = −ρkx
[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
et +
[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]
(1− δkx − ρkx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
εt,
with Ek,t standing for either Ej,l,t or El,t, and ρ
k, δk correspondingly for ρp, δp or ρh, δh.
Hence, productivity and optimism shocks raise actual output, but also lead to output
misperceptions. Consider first the optimism shock. Producers expect aggregate productiv-
ity to be high—resulting in higher demand—but also observe that their own productivity is
unchanged, which they attribute to a negative realization of the idiosyncratic productivity
component. Consequently, they raise prices above what they expect the average price level
to be. However, due to strategic complementarities in price stetting, the deviation from
the expected average price level is subdued. Consumers, in turn, observe higher prices.
They too attribute this increase to adverse productivity shocks suffered by those particular
firms from which they buy. This allows households to entertain the notion of higher aggre-
gate productivity and future income. Because the observed price increase relative to the
expected long-run price level is muted, expenditure and, consequently, economic activity
expand. Yet as each producer and each household considers itself unlucky relative to its
peers, current output is actually lower than expected: a negative nowcast error obtains.14
After a productivity shock, on the other hand, producers do not fully trust the signal
about the aggregate component and attribute some of the increased productivity to id-
iosyncratic factors. They lower prices below what they expect the average price level to
14As pointed out by Lorenzoni (2009), the optimism shock provides a possible microfoundation for the
traditional concept of a demand shock: agents are too optimistic about economic fundamentals, resulting
in unusually high demand.
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be. Consumers expect higher income and raise consumption. However, both producers and
their customers expect other producers to set higher prices and consequently underestimate
actual output. A positive nowcast error obtains.
Furthermore, observe that monetary policy shocks have no impact on nowcast errors.
More generally, any other shock that enters the information set of households and pro-
ducers will not generate nowcast errors, as both are aware of the economic environment
and hence the effect of shocks. Misperceptions about economic activity thus arise only
after imperfectly observed shocks, such as innovations to productivity, or incorrect signals
regarding productivity.
1.3.7 Identification
In addition to clarifying the nature of optimism shocks, the model allows us to address
concerns about whether optimism shocks can be uncovered at all on the basis of an esti-
mated VAR model. In this regard, the set of actual time series used in the estimation is
crucial. Noting that we estimate our VAR in Section 1.4 on time series for nowcast errors,
labor productivity, and hours worked, that is, on the following vector
Y˜ ′t =
[
∆yt − Ek,t∆yt ∆(yt − lt) lt
]
,
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given Y˜t, the dynamics of the model can be represented by a VAR(1):
Y˜t = AY˜t−1 +BV˜t,
where
V˜ ′t =
[
εt et θt
]
,
and the matrices A and B are given in the proof.
Intuitively, we are able to cast the model dynamics in VAR form because we rely on
variables that are not contemporaneously observed in the model. If, instead, one were to
restrict the VAR to contain variables observed by agents in real time, the model would
generally not be invertible. Proposition 3 is thus consistent with the result of Blanchard,
L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013), according to which optimism shocks cannot be recovered
from actual time-series data by an econometrician who has no informational advantage over
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market participants. Yet as documented in Section 1.2, actual nowcast errors regarding
output growth can be sizeable. To the extent that they can be measured ex post, they
allow us to identify optimism shocks.
Finally, the model also provides us with specific identification restrictions, which we
impose on the VAR model below. Given matrices A and B, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Monetary policy shocks have no impact on the nowcast error, neither in the
short nor the long run. Furthermore, optimism shocks do not alter labor productivity in
the long run.
1.4 The effects of optimism shocks
We are now in a position to identify the effects of optimism shocks in actual time-series
data and to quantify their contribution to U.S. short-run fluctuations. We do so within
an estimated VAR model, combining long-run restrictions (see, for instance, Gal´ı 1999)
and short-run restrictions, which we impose on nowcast errors. Including a time series of
nowcast errors in the VAR model is key to our identification strategy. It represents an
informational advantage over market participants and allows us to isolate optimism and
productivity shocks. In the following, we discuss our VAR specification and identification
strategy before turning to the results.
1.4.1 VAR specification
Our VAR model includes three variables. Under the baseline specification we include
the nowcast error computed on the basis of first-release data, the growth rate of labor
productivity, and hours worked in the vector of endogenous variables.15 Formally, as Y˜t is
the vector containing these variables in the given order, the VAR model in reduced form
reads as
Y˜t =
L∑
i=1
AiY˜t−i + νt, (1.4.1)
15Labor productivity is measured by (the first difference of the natural logarithm of) output per hour of
all persons in the nonfarm business sector and hours worked is the natural logarithm of the corresponding
hours. Both series are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Results are robust, however, once
we measure labor productivity as output per person and hours as employment, both obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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where L is the number of lags. νt is a vector of potentially mutually correlated innovations
of which Ω = Eνν ′ is the covariance matrix. We also include a constant in the VAR
model.16
We estimate the model under our baseline specification on quarterly data covering
the period 1980Q1–2012Q4. While our measure of nowcast errors is available since the
late 1960s (see Section 1.2), we disregard observations prior to 1980 since the conduct of
monetary policy arguably changed considerably after this time (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler
2000).17 Below, we also report results of a sensitivity analysis exploring the robustness of
our results with respect to estimating the model on the full sample.
Regarding the number of lags L, we account for concerns about a lag-truncation bias.
Arguably, it is particularly severe in the case that long-run restrictions are imposed on the
VAR model to achieve identification (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2008). De Graeve and
Westermark (2013) perform Monte Carlo experiments and find that raising the number of
lags may be a viable strategy to reduce the severity of the problem. Hence, for our baseline
specification we set L = 8. We document below that the results are robust with respect to
using a smaller number of lags.
We aim to identify structural shocks contained in the vector, t, with νt = Bt and
E′ = I. Given estimates for Ω and the Ai matrices, we identify B by simultaneously
imposing short and long-run restrictions. Without loss of generality, we assume that t
contains from top to bottom the productivity shock, the optimism shock, and a third shock
to which we do not attach any structural interpretation. Key to our identification strategy
is the insight that nowcast errors can only be the result of the first two shocks—both in
the short and the long run. To tell productivity and optimism shocks apart, we impose
as a third restriction that optimism shocks do not impact labor productivity in the long
run. All restrictions are consistent with the model developed in the previous section (see
Corollary 1). Formally, our identification assumptions impose the following restrictions on
the matrices B and A0, which determine the contemporaneous and the long-run impact,
16Below, we additionally consider alternative trend specifications to address the potential non-
stationarity of the time series for hours worked.
17Alternatively, one might consider a later starting date for the sample in order to account for the decline
in business cycle volatility after 1983 (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). We find that results are not
sensitive in this respect.
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respectively:
B =
 ∗ ∗ 0∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
 , A0 ≡ (I − L∑
i=1
Ai
)−1
B =
 ∗ ∗ 0∗ 0 ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
 . (1.4.2)
1.4.2 Results
We compute impulse response functions on the basis of the estimated model and display
results in Figure 1.2. The columns (from left to right) display the responses to a pro-
ductivity shock, an optimism shock, and the third shock. Solid lines represent the point
estimate, while dashed lines indicate 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by boostrap
sampling. The rows display the responses of the nowcast error, output (implied by those
of labor productivity and hours), labor productivity, and hours respectively. In each case,
horizontal axes measure time in quarters, while vertical axes measure percentage points in
the case of the nowcast error and percentage deviations from steady state otherwise. To
facilitate the comparison of productivity and optimism shocks, we consider in each case an
expansionary shock which triggers an increase of output and normalize its size such that
it induces a nowcast error equal to 1 percentage point (annualized) in absolute value.
A first noteworthy result is the joint responses of the nowcast error and output to
both structural shocks. While output rises in each instant, we find that productivity
shocks induce a positive response of the nowcast error and optimism shocks induce a
negative response. This finding is in line with the prediction of the model developed
in Section 1.3 above, even though the response of the nowcast error to both shocks has
been left unrestricted. More generally, the finding that optimism shocks induce a negative
co-movement of the nowcast error and output is remarkable because the unconditional co-
movement of both series is positive, as established in Section 1.2. In our view, the result
that the co-movement changes from unconditionally positive to negative conditional on
optimism shocks lends additional support to our identification strategy.
The response of the nowcast error is short-lived, while the response of output to both
shocks is quite persistent and displays hump-shaped adjustment dynamics. In fact, the
short-run dynamics are fairly similar in both instances. The impact increase is approx-
imately 0.5 percent and the peak response is reached after about 6 quarters. While the
peak response is somewhat stronger in the case of an optimism shock, the response is more
persistent in the case of a productivity shock, even though we still find the output response
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Figure 1.2: Impulse responses to identified shocks
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Notes: baseline VAR model; solid lines indicate point estimates, dashed lines 90 percent confidence bounds
obtained by bootstrap sampling (1000 repetitions). Horizontal axes measure quarters. Vertical axes:
percentage points in the case of the nowcast error, percent otherwise.
to an optimism shock marginally significant after 20 quarters. The third row shows the
response of labor productivity. It increases in response to a productivity shock on impact,
but also in the long run. In line with theory, productivity declines in response to an opti-
mism shock, but the effect is only marginally significant. Note that optimism shocks are
not allowed to impact labor productivity in the long run under our identification scheme.
The responses of hours are shown in the last row. In the short run the responses mimic
that of output. It is somewhat weaker in the case of productivity shocks and somewhat
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stronger in the case of optimism shocks, reflecting the differential effect of these shocks on
labor productivity. In the long run hours are back to the pre-shock level.
In order to contrast the transmission of optimism shocks to those of productivity shocks
it is of interest to investigate their effects on variables other than those included in the
baseline model. To estimate the impulse responses of these variables while economizing
on the degrees of freedom, we rotate additional variables into our baseline VAR model,
replacing the time series for hours worked. Figure 1.3 displays results for four additional
variables of particular interest. The first two rows show the responses of consumption
and investment respectively.18 Applying the same normalization as above, we find that
productivity and optimism shocks raise consumption and investment, although the effect
is somewhat stronger and more persistent in the case of productivity shocks.
The third row of Figure 1.3 shows the response of core CPI inflation. We find that pro-
ductivity shocks tend to be deflationary, although the response is not significant. Instead,
inflation rises immediately and strongly in response to the optimism shock. Optimism
shocks accordingly have the flavor of what has been traditionally referred to as a demand
shock (Lorenzoni 2009).
Finally, in the last row, we show the response of a direct measure of total factor pro-
ductivity. Investigating its response to productivity shocks helps to assess the plausibility
of our identification scheme, which relies on the absence of a long-run impact of optimism
shocks on labor productivity. The time series for total factor productivity is obtained
from Fernald (2012), as in Section 1.2 above.19 Since it ends in 2009Q3, we estimate the
VAR model on the longest available data series (1968Q4–2009Q3). The impulse responses
show a strong increase of TFP to the productivity shock identified on the basis of long-run
restrictions, but no reaction to optimism shocks—in line with the assumptions underlying
our identification strategy.
Overall, we find plausible results regarding the effects of optimism shocks and thus turn
to the question that motivates our analysis: namely, to what extent are optimism shocks
an autonomous source of business cycle fluctuations? In order to gauge their contribution
to economic fluctuations we compute a forecast error variance decomposition. Table 1.3
reports the results. We find that productivity and optimism shocks are responsible for two
thirds and one third of the variation in the nowcast error respectively. This finding holds
18Consumption is measured by real personal consumption expenditures and investment by real gross
private domestic investment, both from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
19Inflation is based on the consumer price index for all urban consumers for all items less food and energy
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and TFP is utilization-adjusted TFP in producing non-equipment
output of Fernald (2012).
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to identified shocks
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Notes: each row displays the response of an additional variable replacing hours in the baseline VAR model
(see Figure 1.2).
irrespective of the forecast horizon. Recall that in the short and long run nowcast errors are
restricted to be driven only by these two shocks. Regarding output, productivity shocks
account for the bulk of fluctuations, yet optimism shocks also contribute substantially. In
the short run their contribution rises from 17 percent to almost one third after about three
years, declining thereafter.
These findings are in a similar order of magnitude than those reported by Blanchard,
L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013). They estimate a medium-scale DSGE model featuring
“noise shocks”. These shocks are structurally identical to optimism shocks as defined in the
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Table 1.3: Forecast error variance decomposition
Productivity Optimism Rest
Nowcast Error 1 69.83 30.16 0.00
4 66.57 30.38 3.05
12 61.27 29.94 8.79
40 60.78 30.02 9.20
Output 1 64.77 17.07 18.16
4 55.29 27.82 16.89
12 55.09 32.77 12.14
40 53.67 25.79 20.54
Labor Productivity 1 23.41 0.75 75.84
4 14.06 0.44 85.50
12 9.63 8.77 81.61
40 20.78 6.50 72.72
Hours 1 42.10 31.29 26.61
4 50.29 45.76 3.94
12 42.31 55.90 1.79
40 35.26 62.88 1.85
Notes: Results are presented for the baseline VAR model. Each panel reports
the decomposition of the forecast error variance for the variable of interest,
considering a forecast horizon of 1, 4, 12 and 40 quarters. The contribution of
the three shocks is reported in the appropriately labeled columns.
present paper and account for about 20 percent of output volatility.20 Instead, Barsky and
Sims (2012), estimating a fully specified DSGE model through indirect inference methods,
find that “animal spirit” shocks account for almost none of the volatility of output. While
their animal spirit shock is conceptually closely related to optimism shocks, it is restricted
to pertain to future productivity (growth) only. Moreover, their analysis is centered around
innovations to consumer confidence, which they find to reflect news rather than animal
spirits. Once we rotate their time series of confidence innovations as a third variable into
our VAR model, we find it to be mostly driven by the “rest” shock.21 This finding is
20In a similar exercise, Hu¨rtgen (2013) obtains a value of 14 percent.
21Specifically, we consider the series for confidence innovations of Barsky and Sims (2012), which is
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consistent with the results of Barsky and Sims (2012) insofar as the rest shock will pick up
anticipated productivity shocks under our identification scheme.
1.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We conduct a number of experiments to explore the robustness of our results. First,
we consider alternative measures of the nowcast error, which is key to our identification
strategy. Our baseline VAR is estimated on nowcast errors computed on the basis of
first-release data. Results in Section 1.2 suggest that nowcast errors based on final-release
data may differ somewhat. We therefore estimate our VAR model while replacing the first-
release nowcast error with the final-release nowcast error. The estimated impulse responses
to productivity and optimism shocks obtained under this specification are shown in the
left panel of Figure 1.4, confirming our findings for the baseline VAR model reported in
Figure 1.2.
In what follows we explore to what extent results are robust once we consider a differ-
ent sampling frequency, as our identification strategy relies on assumptions regarding the
available information at the time forecasters are asked to predict current output growth.
Specifically, forecasters are assumed to have no information regarding current innovations
to productivity. Due to the frequency of releases of GDP data, our baseline VAR model is
estimated on quarterly observations. In order to construct an alternative monthly measure
of the nowcast error, we use data for industrial production and an appropriate survey of
professional forecasters by Bloomberg.22 Results are shown in the right panel of Figure 1.4.
From a qualitative point of view, they are in line with those obtained for the baseline VAR
model, despite considerable differences in the sample (1996M10–2012M12), data frequency,
and the measure of economic activity.
Next, we are turning to alternative assumptions regarding our sample and the number
based on the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Confidence innovations are computed on the basis of their
VAR model and their orthogonalization with confidence ordered first. We include confidence innovations
in our baseline VAR model (using the longest overlapping sample), replacing the time series for hours
worked. Computing a forecast error variance decomposition, we find that about two thirds of the short-
run variance of confidence innovations is due to the rest shock, while the optimism shock accounts for
less than 5 percent. Moreover, we find that only the rest shock has a significant impact on confidence
innovations. It is positive and short-lived.
22The Bloomberg survey forecasts are available since 1996M10. We consider data up to 2012M12. The
series on monthly hours is the index of aggregate weekly hours of production for workers in manufacturing
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the corresponding growth rate of labor productivity is the
difference in the growth rates of the volume index of industrial production, obtained from the Federal
Reserve, and hours. We estimate the VAR with 24 lags, that is, we include two years as in the baseline
model estimated on quarterly data.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses to productivity and optimism shock: Sensitivity analysis I
SPF final release data Bloomberg survey on industrial production
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Notes: left panel shows results for nowcast error based on final-release data; right panel shows results for
nowcast error based on monthly data for industrial production (sample: 1996M10–2012M12); horizontal
axis measures months.
of lags included in the VAR model. Results are shown in Figure 1.5. The left panel shows
results for the longest possible sample given data availability: 1968Q4–2012Q4. They
are very similar to those of the baseline specification (see Figure 1.2). An exception is
the response of labor productivity to the productivity shock which turns insignificantly
negative after about six quarters. However, in the long run (not shown), the response is
positive as in the baseline VAR. The right panel of Figure 1.5 shows results for the model
estimated on four lags only. Again, results are fairly similar to those obtained under the
baseline specification.
Finally, we explore the robustness of our results with respect to alternative assumptions
regarding potential trends in the time series for hours worked. This issue has received
considerable attention in the literature, as some studies found the trend specification to
be crucial for the sign of the response of hours worked to a productivity shock. This
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Figure 1.5: Impulse responses to productivity and optimism shock: Sensitivity analysis II
Sample starts 1968 Four lags
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Notes: left panel shows results for baseline VAR model estimated on sample starting in 1968Q4, see Figure
1.2; right panel shows results for VAR model with four lags.
is not the case in our setup. Recall that we do not allow for a trend in hours in our
baseline specification. Figure 1.6 shows results for a specification where hours enter in
first differences (left panel) and for a specification where a linear-quadratic trend has been
removed from hours worked prior to estimation (right panel).23
Our results may therefore also shed some light on the so-called “hours puzzle” (see Gal´ı
1999, Francis and Ramey 2005, and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2008, among others).
Given that hours unambiguously rise after (unexpected) productivity shocks under our
identification scheme, a decline in hours documented elsewhere is likely due to productivity
innovations which have no effect on nowcast errors. This, in turn, may be the result of
innovations to productivity that have been anticipated.
23Hours entering the VAR model either in levels, first differences or detrended with a linear-quadratic
trend are commonly considered to be the most plausible specifications, see Gal´ı and Rabanal (2005). Our
results are also robust to detrending hours with a one-sided HP-filter.
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Figure 1.6: Impulse responses to productivity and optimism shock: Sensitivity analysis III
Hours in first differences Hours w/o linear-quadratic trend
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Notes: left panel shows results for hours in first differences, right panel for hours after a linear quadratic
trend has been removed.
1.5 Conclusion
To what extent are changes of expectations an autonomous source of business cycle fluc-
tuations? In this paper, we pursue a new approach to address this question. Barsky and
Sims (2012) and Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013) estimate fully-specified DSGE
models to quantify the importance of “noise” or “undue optimism”, reaching quite different
conclusions. We employ a structural VAR model instead, thereby imposing less structure
on the data. Yet, as shown by Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013), identifying the
effects of optimism shocks within VARs constitutes a formidable challenge.
Our empirical strategy is based on an ex-post informational advantage over market par-
ticipants. Namely, we compute nowcast errors regarding current output growth as the
difference between actual output growth and the median forecast in the Survey of Profes-
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sional Forecasters. Nowcast errors are a reduced-form measure of misperceptions, which
we show to respond systematically to innovations in total factor productivity. However,
we find them not to be significantly affected by policy innovations or uncertainty shocks
which are, in some sense, observable.
Drawing on Lorenzoni (2009), we put forward a stylized business cycle model which
gives rise to nowcast errors due to productivity and optimism shocks, as agents do not
observe output contemporaneously. Shocks which are common information do not generate
a nowcast error. Importantly, we use this model to show that optimism shocks can be
recovered from time-series data on nowcast errors.
Given these results, we estimate a VAR model on U.S. time series including the nowcast
error, labor productivity, and hours worked for the period 1980Q1–2012Q4. We identify
unanticipated shocks to total factor productivity and optimism shocks by combining short
and long-run restrictions. Specifically, we assume that optimism shocks and productivity
shocks can trigger nowcast errors, but that optimism shocks do not affect labor productivity
in the long run. We find that both shocks have a sizable and persistent effect on output, yet
their effect on the nowcast error differs fundamentally. We find that productivity shocks
induce a positive nowcast error, that is, growth is higher than expected. Optimism shocks,
on the other hand, induce a negative nowcast error, that is, growth is lower than expected.
While this result is quite intuitive, it is remarkable because it implies that the correlation of
nowcast errors and economic activity conditional on optimism shocks changes sign relative
to the unconditional correlation.
According to the forecast error variance decomposition, the contribution of optimism
shocks rises to some 30 percent of output fluctuations at a 3-year horizon and declines
thereafter. In the very short run our result is close to 20 percent, the value reported by
Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013) for a 1-year horizon. Differences relative to
Barsky and Sims (2012) are likely to reflect differences in the informational content of the
nowcast error of current output growth on the one hand and of consumer sentiment data
on the other.
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to Zeno Enders and Gernot Mu¨ller, who are co-authors of Chapter 1.
32
Appendix
In Appendix 1.B, we provide the proofs for Propositions 3.1-3 in Section 1.3. In a prelim-
inary step, we outline the model solution and key equilibrium relationships in Appendix
1.A. Throughout, we consider a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions of
the model. Small-scale letters indicate percentage deviations from steady state.
1.A Model solution
We solve the model by backward induction. That is, we start by deriving inflation expec-
tations regarding period t+ 1. Using the result in the Euler equation of the third stage of
period t allows us to determine price-setting decision during stage two. Eventually, we ob-
tain the short-run responses of aggregate variables to unexpected changes in productivity
or optimism shocks.
Expectations regarding period t + 1. Below, Ek,t stands for either Ej,l,t, referring to
the information set of producer j on island l at the time of her pricing decisions, or for El,t,
referring to the information set of the household on island l at the time of its consumption
decision. Variables with only time subscripts refer to economy-wide values. The wage in
period t+ 1 is set according to the expected aggregate labor supply
Ek,tϕlt+1 = Ek,t(wt+1 − pt+1 − ct+1).
This equation is combined with the aggregated production function
Ek,tyt+1 = Ek,t(xt+1 + αlt+1),
the expected aggregate labor demand
Ek,t(wt+1 − pt+1) = Ek,t[xt+1 + (1− α)lt+1],
and market clearing yt+1 = ct+1 to obtain Ek,txt+1 = Ek,tyt+1 = Ek,tct+1. Furthermore, the
expected Euler equation, together with the Taylor rule, is
Ek,tct+1 = Ek,t(ct+2 + pit+2 − ψpit+1).
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Agents expect the economy to be in a new steady state tomorrow (Ek,tct+1 = Ek,tct+2) given
the absence of state variables other than technology, which follows a unit root process.
Ruling out explosive paths yields
Ek,tpit+2 = Ek,tpit+1 = 0.
Stage three of period t. After prices are set, each household observes n prices in the
economy. Since the productivity signal is public, the productivity level aj,l,t = al,t—which
is the same for all producers j ∈ [0, 1] on island l—can be inferred from each price pj,l,t of
the good from producer j on island l. Hence, household l forms its expectations about the
change in aggregate productivity according to
El,t∆xt = ρ
h
xst + δ
h
x aˆl,t,
where aˆl,t is the average over the realizations of am,t−xt−1 for each location m in household
l’s sample. The coefficients ρhx and δ
h
x are equal across households and depend on n, σ
2
e , σ
2
ε ,
and σ2η in the following way:
ρhx =
σ2η/n
σ2e + σ
2
η/n+
σ2eσ
2
η/n
σ2ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0 if n→∞
, δhx =
σ2e
σ2e + σ
2
η/n+
σ2eσ
2
η/n
σ2ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
→1 if n→∞
. (1.A.1)
Producers, on the other hand, only observe the signal and their own productivity. They
thus form expectations according to
Ej,l,t∆xt = ρ
p
xst + δ
p
x(al,t − xt−1),
with
ρpx =
σ2η
σ2e + σ
2
η +
σ2ησ
2
e
σ2ε
δpx =
σ2e
σ2e + σ
2
η +
σ2ησ
2
e
σ2ε
,
such that δhx > δ
p
x because of the higher information content of households’ observations.
Consumption follows an Euler equation with household-specific inflation, as only a subset
of goods is bought. Agents expect no differences between households for t + 1, such that
expected aggregate productivity and the overall price level impact today’s consumption.
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Using additionally El,tpt+1 = El,tpt and El,txt+1 = El,txt gives
cl,t = El,txt + El,tpt − pl,t − rt. (1.A.2)
Similar to the updating formula for technology, households use their available information
to form an estimate about the aggregate price level pt according to
El,tpt = ρ
h
pst + δ
h
p aˆl,t + κ
h
pwt + τ
h
p xt−1 − ηhprt. (1.A.3)
Combining the above this gives
cl,t = (1 + τ
h
p )xt−1 + ρ
h
xpst + δ
h
xpaˆl,t + κ
h
pwt − (1 + ηhp )rt − pl,t, (1.A.4)
where ρhx = ρ
h
x + ρ
h
p and δ
h
xp = δ
h
x + δ
h
p . We will solve for the undetermined coefficients
below.
Stage two of period t. During the second stage, firms obtain idiosyncratic signals about
their productivity. Below, the index p˜l,t is the average price index of customers visiting
island l. If customers bought on all (that is, infinitely many) islands in the economy,
it would correspond to the overall price level. Since consumers only buy on a subset of
islands, the price of their own island has a non-zero weight in their price index, which is
taken into account further below. Firms set prices according to
pj,l,t = wt +
1− α
α
Ej,l,tyj,l,t − 1
α
al,t
≡ k′ + k′1Ej,l,tp˜l,t + k′2Ej,l,tyt − k′3al,t,
with
k′ =
α
α + γ(1− α)wt k
′
1 =
γ(1− α)
α + γ(1− α) k
′
2 =
1− α
α + γ(1− α) k
′
3 =
1
α + γ(1− α) .
(1.A.5)
Evaluating the expectation of firm j about aggregate output in period t, using equation
(1.A.4), results in
Ej,l,tyt =κ
h + ρhxpst + δ
h
xpEj,l,t
(
1
n
al,t +
n− 1
n
Ej,l,txt − xt−1
)
−
(
1
n
pj,l,t +
n− 1
n
Ej,l,tpt
)
,
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where κh = (1+ τhp )xt−1− (1+ηhp )rt+κhpwt is publicly available information. Furthermore,
it is taken into account that productivity of island l has a non-zero weight in the sample
of productivity levels observed by consumers visiting island l. Note that producers still
take the price index of the consumers as given, since they buy infinitely many goods on
the same island. Inserting this in the above pricing equation yields (here, pt is the average
of the prices charged by producers of all other islands, which is the overall price index as
there are infinitely many locations)
pj,l,t ≡k + k1Ej,l,tpt + k˜st − k3al,t,
with
Ξ = 1− 1
n
(k′1 − k′2) k =
1
Ξ
{
k′ + k′2κ
h +
k′2δ
h
xp
n
[(n− 1)(1− δpx)− 1]xt−1
}
(1.A.6)
k1 =
n− 1
nΞ
(k′1 − k′2) k˜ =
k′2
Ξ
(
ρhxp + δ
h
xpρ
p
x
n− 1
n
)
k3 =
1
Ξ
{
k′3 +
k′2δ
h
xp
n
[(n− 1)δpx − 1]
}
.
Aggregating over all producers gives the aggregate price index
pt = k + k1Etpt + k˜st − k3xt,
where
∫
al,tdl = xt and Etpt =
∫∫
Ej,l,tpt djdl is the average expectation of the price level.
The expectation of firm j of this aggregate is therefore
Ej,l,tpt = k + k˜st − k3Ej,l,txt + k1Ej,l,tEtpt
= k +
(
k˜ − k3ρpx
)
st − k3δpxal,t − k3(1− δpx)xt−1 + k1Ej,l,tEtpt. (1.A.7)
Inserting the last equation into (1.A.6) gives
pj,l,t = k + k1k − k1k3(1− δpx)xt−1 +
[
k˜ + k1
(
k˜ − k3δpx
)]
st − (k3 + k1k3δpx) ajt + k21Ej,l,tEtpt.
To find Ej,l,tEtpt, note that firm j’s expectations of the average of (1.A.7) are
Ej,l,tEtpt = k − k3(1− δpx)(1 + δpx)xt−1 +
(
k˜ − k3ρpx − k3δpxρpx
)
st − k3δpx2al,t + k1Ej,l,tE(2)t pt,
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where E
(2)
is the average expectation of the average expectation. The price of firm j is
found by plugging the last equation into the second-to-last:
pj,l,t =
(
k + k1k + k
2
1k
)− [k1k3(1− δpx) + k21k3(1− δpx)(1 + δpx)]xt−1
+
[
k˜ + k1
(
k˜ − k3ρpx
)
+ k21
(
k˜ − k3ρpx − k3δpxρpx
)]
st
− (k3 + k1k3δpx + k21k3δpx2) al,t + k31Ej,l,tE(2)pt.
Continuing like this results in some infinite sums
pj,l,t =k
(
1 + k1 + k
2
1 + k
3
1 . . .
)
− k1k3(1− δpx)
[
1 + k1(1 + δ
p
x) + k
2
1(1 + δ
p
x + δ
p
x
2) + k31(1 + δ
p
x + δ
p
x
2 + δpx
3 . . .)
]
xt−1
+
[
k˜ + k1
(
k˜ − k3ρpx
)
+ k21
(
k˜ − k3ρpx − k3δpxρpx
)
+ k31
(
k˜ − k3ρpx − k3ρpxδpx − k3ρpxδpx2
)
+ . . .
]
st
− k3
(
1 + k1δ
p
x + k
2
1δ
p
x
2 + k31δ
p
x
3 . . .
)
al,t + k
∞
1 Ej,l,tE
(∞)
pt.
For the terms in the third line (see below for the proof that |k1| < 1) we have
k˜ + k1
(
k˜ − k3ρpx
)
+ k21
(
k˜ − k3ρpx − k3δpxρpx
)
+ k31
(
k˜ − k3ρpx − k3ρpxδpx − k3ρpxδpx2
)
+ k41
(
k˜ − k3ρpx − k3ρpxδpx − k3ρpxδpx2 − k3ρpxδpx3
)
. . .
=k˜(1 + k1 + k
2
1 + k
3
1 . . .)−
(
k1k3ρ
p
x + k
2
1k3ρ
p
x + k
3
1k3ρ
p
x . . .
)
− (δpxk21k3ρpx + δpxk31k3ρpx + δpxk41k3ρpx . . .)− (δpx2k31k3ρpx + δpx2k41k3ρpx + δpx3k51k3ρpx . . .) . . .
=k˜(1 + k1 + k
2
1 + k
3
1 . . .)− k1k3
(
ρpx
1− k1 +
ρpxδ
p
xk1
1− k1 +
ρpxδ
p
x
2k21
1− k1 . . .
)
=
k˜
1− k1 −
k1k3ρ
p
x
1− k1
(
1 + δpxk1 + δ
p
x
2k21 . . .
)
=
k˜
1− k1 −
k1k3ρ
p
x
(1− k1)(1− δpxk1) .
Proceeding similarly with the terms in the second line results in
pj,l,t =
k
1− k1−
k1(1− δpx)
1− k1
k3
1− k1δpxxt−1+
1
1− k1
(
k˜ − ρpx
k1k3
1− k1δpx
)
st− k3
1− k1δpxal,t+k
∞
1 E
(∞)
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
pt.
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Setting idiosyncratic technology shocks equal to zero in order to track the effects of aggre-
gate shocks and observing that all firms then set the same price gives
pt ≡ k¯1 + k¯2st + k¯3xt,
with
k¯1 =
1
1− k1
[
k − (1− δpx)
k1k3
1− k1δpxxt−1
]
k¯2 =
1
1− k1
(
k˜ − ρpx
k1k3
1− k1δpx
)
k¯3 = − k3
1− k1δpx .
(1.A.8)
To arrive at qualitative predictions for output growth and the nowcast error after the
structural shocks εt and et, we need to determine the sign and the size of k¯3. Note that
according to (1.A.5), 0 < k′1 − k′2 < 1 because 0 < α < 1 and γ > 1. According to the
definition of k1 in (1.A.6), this implies (observe that n > 1)
0 < k1 < 1.
Turning to k3, note that, according to (1.A.6)
−k3 =δhxp
k′2 − nk′3/δhxp + k′2(n− 1)δpx
n− (k′1 − k′2)
.
The first nominator in the bracket is, observing (1.A.5),
k′2 − nk′3/δhxp =
1− n/δhxp − α
α + γ(1− α) .
Using (1.A.5) and (1.A.6) yields
−k3 = δhxp
(1− α)[(n− 1)δpx + 1]− n/δhxp
(n− 1)[α + γ(1− α)] + 1 .
Plugging this into the definition of k3 in (1.A.8) gives
k3 = δ
h
xp
(1−α)[(n−1)δpx+1]−n/δhxp
(n−1)[α+γ(1−α)]+1
1− δpx (n−1)(γ−1)(1−α)(n−1)[α+γ(1−α)]+1
.
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To obtain δhxp = δ
h
x + δ
h
p , we need to find the undetermined coefficients of equation (1.A.3).
Start by comparing this equation with household l’s expectation of equation (1.A.8):
El,tpt = k1 + k3xt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
κhpwt+τ
h
p xt−1−ηhp rt
+
(
k2 + k3ρ
h
x
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρhp
st + k3δ
h
x︸︷︷︸
δhp
aˆl,t. (1.A.9)
Hence, δhxp = δ
h
x(1 + k3). Inserting this into the above expression for k3 yields
k3 ≡− n/Υ− δ
h
xΨ
Φ− δhxΨ
, (1.A.10)
with
Υ = (n− 1)[α + γ(1− α)] + 1 > 0 Ψ =(1− α)[(n− 1)δpx + 1]/Υ > 0
Φ = 1− δpx(n− 1)(γ − 1)(1− α)/Υ.
The signs obtain because n > 1, 0 < α < 1, δpx > 0, and γ > 1. Observe that ΨΥ < n
because δpx ≤ 1. Hence,
n/Υ− δhxΨ > 0
n− δhx︸︷︷︸
>0,<1
ΨΥ︸︷︷︸
<n
> 0,
implying that the nominator of (1.A.10) is positive. Turning to the denominator Φ− δhxΨ,
observe that Φ − Ψ > 0. Hence, the denominator of (1.A.10) is positive as well, and we
have k3 < 0. Next, consider that n/Υ < Φ and we obtain
−1 < k3 < 0.
This is a key result for the derivation of Propositions 3.1-3, see Appendix 1.B. Multiplying
the nominator and the denominator of the fraction in equation (1.A.10) by Υ and rewriting
gives the expression used in Proposition 3.1.
Stage one of period t As information sets of agents are perfectly aligned during stage
one, we use the expectation operator Et to denote stage-one expectations in what follows.
Combining the results regarding expectations about inflation in period t+1 with the Euler
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equation, the Taylor rule, and the random walk assumption for xt gives
Etyt = Etxt − ψEtpit.
Remember that the monetary policy shock realizes after wages are set. Its expected value
before wage-setting is zero. Using Etxt = Etyt (which results from combining labor supply
and demand with the production function), we obtain
Etpit = 0,
used in the derivations above. Nominal wages are set in line with these expectations. We
thus have determinacy of the price level. The central bank, setting the interest rate after
wages are determined, also expects zero inflation in the absence of monetary policy shocks.
To find the effects of monetary policy shocks on the interest rate, including feedback effects
via changes in expected inflation, note that according to equation (1.A.9)
k1 + k3xt−1 = κhpwt + τ
h
p xt−1 − ηhprt,
where, observing equations (1.A.5), (1.A.6), and (1.A.8),
k1 =
1
(1− k1)Ξ
[
α
α + γ(1− α) + k
′
2κ
h
p
]
wt −
k′2(1 + η
h
p )
(1− k1)Ξ rt
+
1
(1− k1)Ξ
{
k′2(1 + τ
h
p ) + k
′
2δ
h
xp
[
n− 1
n
(1− δpx)− 1
]
− (1− δ
p
x)k1k3Ξ
1− k1δpx
}
xt−1.
Hence,
−ηhp =
k′2(1 + η
h
p )
(1− k1)Ξ =
α− 1
α
,
which is the impact of rt on the price level. To finally determine the response of rt, use
this insight in the Taylor rule, resulting in
rt = ψ
α− 1
α
rt + θt =
α
α + ψ(1− α)θt. (1.A.11)
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1.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Aggregating individual Euler equations (1.A.2) over all in-
dividuals, using (1.A.8), (1.A.9), and (1.A.11), gives
yt =El,txt + El,tpt − pt − rt
=xt−1 + ρhx(1 + k3)st +
[
δhx + k3(δ
h
x − 1)
]
εt − α
α + ψ(1− α)θt
=xt−1 + ρhx(1 + k3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
et +
[
δhx + ρ
h
x − k3(1− δhx − ρhx)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
εt− α
α + ψ(1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
θt,
where 1 − δhx − ρhx > 0 because of (1.A.1). Note that if households have full information
(n→∞), we get ρhx → 0 and δhx → 1. Defining Ω ≡ −k3, we can write
yt = xt−1 + ρhx(1− Ω)et +
[
(δhx + ρ
h
x)(1− Ω) + Ω
]
εt − α
α + ψ(1− α)θt. (1.B.1)
The signs indicated above result from 0 < Ω = −k3 < 1 (derived in Appendix 1.A),
completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Now consider the nowcast error, where expectations are
either those of households or producers, that is, Ek,t substitutes for either Ej,l,t or El,t, and
ρk, δk correspondingly for ρp, δp or ρh, δh.
Ek,tyt =xt−1 + ρhx
(
1 + k3
)
st +
[
δhx + k3(δ
h
x − 1)
]
Ek,txt − rt
=xt−1 +
{
ρhx(1 + k3) + [δ
h
x + k3(δ
h
x − 1)]ρkx
}
st +
[
δhx + k3(δ
h
x − 1)
]
δkxεt − rt.
yt − Ek,tyt =− ρkx
[
δhx + k3(δ
h
x − 1)
]
st +
[
δhx + k3(δ
h
x − 1)
]
(1− δkx)εt
=−ρkx
[
δhx + k3(δ
h
x − 1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
et +
[
δhx + k3(δ
h
x − 1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1− δkx − ρkx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
εt,
or
yt − Ek,tyt = −ρkx
[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]
et +
[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]
(1− δkx − ρkx)εt. (1.B.2)
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The fact that 0 < Ω < 1 (see Appendix 1.A) allows us to determine the signs of the effects
of the shocks on the nowcast error. 
Proof of Proposition 3 The model can be written in the following state space system:
X˜t+1 = CX˜t +DV˜t
Y˜t = FX˜t +GV˜t,
with Y˜t and V˜t defined in the main text, C = 0, D = I3, and
F =
 0 0 0Ω−1α (1− α)(1− ρhx − δhx) 1−Ωα ρhx(1− α) α−1α+ψ(1−α)
0 0 0

G =

[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]
(1− δkx − ρkx) −ρkx
[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]
0
Ω + 1−Ω
α
[
1− (1− α)(ρhx + δhx)
]
α−1
α
ρhx(1− Ω) 1−αα+ψ(1−α)
(Ω−1)
α
(1− δhx − ρhx) 1−Ωα ρhx −1α+ψ(1−α)
 .
The dynamics of the model can then be represented by the following VAR (see Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, Rubio-Ramı´rez, Sargent, and Watson (2007) for details):
Y˜t+1 = F
∞∑
j=0
(C −DG−1F )jDG−1Y˜t−j +GV˜t+1 = F
∞∑
j=0
(−G−1F )jG−1Y˜t−j +GV˜t+1.
The matrix FG−1 results as
FG−1 =
 0 0 00 0 1− α
0 0 0
 ,
such that
FG−1FG−1 = 0
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and we obtain the final VAR(1) representation24
Y˜t+1 = FG
−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
Y˜t + G︸︷︷︸
≡B
V˜t+1.

Proof of Corollary 1 Using the equations derived in the proof of Proposition 3, the
long-run impact matrix can be calculated as (I3 − FG−1)−1G, that is 1 0 00 1 1− α
0 0 1


[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]
(1− δkx − ρkx) −ρkx
[
δhx(1− Ω) + Ω
]
0
Ω + 1−Ω
α
[
1− (1− α)(ρhx + δhx)
]
α−1
α
ρhx(1− Ω) 1−αα+ψ(1−α)
(Ω−1)
α
(1− δhx − ρhx) 1−Ωα ρhx −1α+ψ(1−α)

=
 ∗ ∗ 01 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗
 ,
where asterisks represent non-zero elements. The middle row captures the long-run impact
of the shocks on the level of labor productivity. The short-run impact of θt on the nowcast
error equals the upper-right entry of G; it is zero. 
24Note that the “poor man’s invertibility condition” of Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramı´rez, Sargent,
and Watson (2007) is satisfied as the matrix −G−1F has rank one and therefore at most one non-zero
eigenvalue. The trace equals zero, such that all eigenvalues are zero and hence strictly less than unity.
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Chapter 2
Measuring Financial Constraints:
New Evidence from 20 Years of
German Survey Data
This study utilizes a survey-based measure of financial constraints obtained from a sample
of German manufacturing firms from 1989 to 2009. A categorization scheme is developed
and multinomial logistic regression models are estimated predicting financial constraints as
a function of different quantitative and qualitative indicators. In contrast to the evidence
provided by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we find the Kaplan & Zingales index to be a reliable
measure of financial constraints. However, our results cast serious doubts on the reliability
of the recently proposed Whited & Wu and the Size and Age index. In addition, we find the
inference on the validity of various financial constraints indicators to be sensitive to the
linearity assumption of the indicator-logit relationship commonly made in applied empirical
work.
2.1 Introduction
The analysis of financial-market imperfections and their impact on firms’ investment de-
cisions occupies a prominent place in macroeconomics and corporate finance (Hubbard
1998). The measurement of financial constraints is key for the empirical strand of this
research and the literature has suggested a variety of indices and sorting criteria based on
firm characteristics. However, there is considerable debate about their relative merits.
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Fazzari and Petersen (1988) constitute investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure
of financial constraints and motivate a large subsequent literature. However, Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) call the findings of this literature into question. Examining the annual
reports and 10-K filings of the sub-sample of firms, which Fazzari and Petersen (1988)
identify as most financially constrained, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find arguably less
financially constrained firms to show significantly greater sensitivities. Subsequently, Lam-
ont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) introduce the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index utilizing
their sample and classification scheme. Since then, the KZ index is probably the most
widely used measure of financial constraints in the empirical literature. However, there is
still considerable debate on the correct measurement of financial constraints.
Given that Kaplan and Zingales (1997) study a narrow sample of 49 low dividend firms
in the U.S. running from 1970 to 1984, the stability of their parameter estimates for larger
and more recent samples is at question. Additional concerns are raised by the work of
Erickson and Whited (2000) who show that one of the variables employed by the KZ
index, Tobin’s q, contains considerable measurement error. Consequently, Whited and Wu
(2006) suggest an alternative financial constraint index not relying on q measures, the WW
index, which they derive from a structural intertemporal investment model using a large
Compustat data set.
More recently, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) add to the criticism of the KZ index, specif-
ically of the underlying classification approach. Although Kaplan and Zingales’s (1997)
procedure is qualitative in nature, they also rely on quantitative information, including
cash holdings as well as dividend and stock repurchase policies. However, part of this
information used to infer on firms financial constraint status is subsequently also employed
to construct the independent variables constituting the index. Building on this critique,
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) apply a categorization approach that is in the spirit of Ka-
plan and Zingales (1997), yet purely qualitative. However, explaining their alternative
financial constraint status with the KZ index variables, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find
their estimates to differ substantially from the original index, casting serious doubt on its
validity.
Moreover, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) also evaluate the WW index and find the im-
provement compared to the KZ index to be marginal. Consequently, the authors advocate
for an alternative approach to measure financial constraints. They propose the SA index,
which relies solely on firms’ size and age, claiming that these are more exogenous than the
surveyed alternatives. Finally, its simplicity and low information requirements are adding
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to the index’s appeal.
We add to the debate about the relative merits of the three indices, in particular about
the validity of the KZ index. Following the approach of Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we
explain firms’ qualitative assessments of their financing conditions by the quantitative vari-
ables employed by the indices. Subsequently, we infer from the signs and the significance
levels of the regression coefficients as well as from the overall model fit on the appropri-
ateness of the tested indicators to measure financial constraints. Moreover, we study the
sensitivity of our estimates with respect to non-linear variable transformations based on
fractional polynomials.
However, the value of our exercise emerges from the data. We employ a survey-based
measure of financial constraints obtained from a sample of German manufacturing firms
running from 1989 to 2009. This measure is not subject to the endogeneity critique put
forward by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). In addition, we utilize survey-based assessments of
firms’ sales expectations as well as of the profitability of the investment projects they face.
Thus, we control for firms investment opportunities without relying on measures of q.
Despite the warranted criticism, we provide evidence that the KZ index is a valid mea-
sure of financial constraints. Our results are particularly striking given the narrow focus of
the original KZ sample. For the WW and the SA index, however, evidence is mixed. Al-
though we find the WW index to significantly outperform a random classification scheme,
coefficient estimates for the comprised indicators are not in line with the original load-
ings. In particular, the industry sales growth variable, which loads positively on the index,
is significantly negatively associated with our qualitative financial constraints indicator.
Yet, Whited and Wu (2006) employ the variable in order to capture the availability of
attractive investment opportunities (high industry sales growth), which are supposed to
be positively associated with (binding) financial constraints. Moreover, for the SA index,
we reject the hypothesis of external validity. Specifically, the index fails to outperform a
random classification algorithm in identifying financially constrained firms. This result is
relevant given that the authors claim the SA index to be a reasonable choice for measuring
financial constraints in many contexts after having extensively studied its robustness and
out of sample performance.
Finally, we find the inference on the validity of certain indicator variables to be sensitive
to the linearity assumption of the indicator-logit relationship commonly made in applied
empirical work. In particular, for firms’ cash flows, dividend payouts, and leverage ratios,
the association with financial constraints seems to be particularly strong for small values.
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With increasing indicator values, however, associations tend to become less pronounced or
even to disappear.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the liter-
ature on the measurement of financial constraints. Section 2.3 introduces our qualitative
financial constraint measure and provides a number of statistics illustrating its properties.
Section 2.4 discusses the empirical framework. Section 2.5 evaluates the three indices. A
final section concludes.
2.2 The evolution of the literature on measuring fi-
nancial constraints
In order to infer either on the existence or on the effects of financial constraints, the
empirical literature usually groups firms ex ante according to their likelihood of facing
financial constraints, and subsequently tests the cash-flow sensitivity of investment across
groups. The first prominent study in this literature is Fazzari and Petersen (1988). The
authors separate financially constrained and unconstrained firms based on dividend payout
ratios. They show that for low dividend paying firms, which are assumed to be more likely
subject to financial constraints, investment decisions are more highly correlated to cash
flow than for firms with higher dividend payout ratios, taking this as evidence for the
existence and relevance of financial market imperfections.
The results of Fazzari and Petersen (1988) motivate a large subsequent literature which
supports their evidence applying different variables to identify financially constrained firms
(for instance, Bond and Meghir 1994 and Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995). Although Dev-
ereux and Schiantarelli (1990) already provide contradicting evidence, namely showing that
larger firms show higher investment-cash flow sensitivities, it is Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
who definitely question the appropriateness of investment-cash flow sensitivities to measure
financial constraints. Examining the annual reports and 10-K filings of the sub-sample of
firms, which Fazzari and Petersen (1988) identify as most financially constrained, Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) find arguably less financially constrained firms to show significantly
greater sensitivities. Subsequent studies confirm their findings and even provide evidence
for a negative relationship between the sensitivity of investment to changes in cash flow
and financial constraints (for instance, Kadapakkam, Kumar, and Riddick 1998, Cleary
2006, and Chen and Chen 2012).
Within the literature on the measurement of financial constraints, the discussion above
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can be considered as the most prominent one. However, additional attempts have been
made to identify financially constrained firms in order to serve different purposes. Musso
and Schiavo (2008) provide a recent review of the empirical strategies being adopted. Ir-
respective of the specific aim of the studies, Musso and Schiavo (2008) find that almost all
of them rely on a limited list of indicators that are associated with informational asym-
metries, and thus potentially constrain firms’ access to external finance. In particular,
this list comprises firms’ size, age, dividend policies, group membership, existence of bond
ratings, and concentration of ownership. However, these proxies show several weaknesses.
As highlighted by Hubbard (1998), financial constraints are cyclical in nature and thus
likely to vary over time. In contrast, most of the proxies for information asymmetries that
firms likely face are highly persistent. In addition, studies relying on the existence of bond
ratings or certain dividend policies usually focus on listed and mature firms. For the bank
based continental European financial system, their results might therefore be less valid
(Rajan and Zingales 1995). Finally, most studies apply a uni-dimensional approach. They
rely on a single indicator and threshold to separate financially constrained firms from those
that are unconstrained.
Few multivariate and time-varying measures of financial constraints were proposed by
the literature. The first, by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001), introduces the KZ
index utilizing the sample and classification scheme of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Ap-
plying an ordered logistic regression framework, they explain firms’ financial constraint
status based on five independent variables derived from firms’ balance sheets and stock
prices in order to build a financial constraints index using the regression coefficients. How-
ever, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) study a narrow sample of 49 low dividend firms in the
U.S. running from 1970 to 1984. Accordingly, using their index coefficients for larger firm
samples and different time periods is questionable. Additional concerns are raised by the
work of Erickson and Whited (2000), who show that one of the variables employed by the
KZ index, Tobin’s q, contains considerable measurement error. Indeed, the capability of
Tobin’s q to approximate for investment opportunities is rather controversial. Again, this
controversy lies at the core of the debate on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as
outlined above.
Although the KZ index is probably the most widely used measure of financial con-
straints in the empirical literature since its introduction, alternative indices have been
proposed. Whited and Wu (2006) question the stability of the parameter estimates of
the KZ index across firms and over time. Although they admit that Kaplan and Zingales
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(1997) convincingly demonstrate a classification scheme that successfully identifies firms
with characteristics associated with external financial constraints, they doubt the exter-
nal validity of the KZ index because of the limited sample size. Also approaching the
intractability of relying on q measures to account for investment opportunities, Whited
and Wu (2006) suggest a different an alternative index. The WW index measures financial
constraints by means of the shadow price of capital derived from a structural intertemporal
investment model using a large Compustat data set running from 1975 to 2001.
In a more recent attempt, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) challenge the KZ index and more
specifically Kaplan and Zingales’s (1997) initial approach to categorize financially con-
strained firms. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) criticize that the categorization is based on
qualitative as well as quantitative information, including a firm’s cash position and its
recent dividend and stock repurchase policy. They claim this to potentially induce endo-
geneity, because the same information is later employed to construct some of the indepen-
dent variables explaining the financial constraint status and constituting the KZ index.
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) further evaluate the sensitivity of Kaplan and Zingales’s (1997)
regression coefficients to a comparable but purely qualitative categorization approach. In
particular, they categorize firms’ financial constraint status based on a qualitative eval-
uation of annual reports and 10-K filings for a randomly selected sample of Compustat
firms running from 1995 to 2004. Explaining their alternative financial constraint status
with the KZ index variables based on a parallel modeling approach, Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) find their estimates to differ substantially from the KZ index coefficients. Further-
more, according to their results, the original KZ index and their model predictions are
approximately uncorrelated, casting serious doubt on the validity of the KZ index.
Moreover, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) also evaluate the WW index by analyzing six
factors of the incorporated indicators that are created from Compustat data. Explaining
their qualitative categorization based on the six indicators, they find only three of them to
show significant coefficients and to agree in sign with the WW index. Given their critique
on the KZ index and their inconclusive results for the WW index, Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) advocate for a conservative approach to measure financial constraints. Specifically,
they propose an alternative index solely relying on firms’ size and age since they claim that
these are more exogenous than the surveyed alternatives. However, they admit that these
variables are rather persistent and thus less likely to capture the time variation in financial
constraints.
According to this literature review, any attempt to assess the validity of existing financial
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constraints measures should come close to meet certain criteria: First, the categorization
of financial constrained and unconstrained firms should not rely on any information that
is subsequently incorporated in the set of explanatory variables to be evaluated. Second,
in order to account for future investment opportunities q measures are controversial and
should be replaced by more appropriate alternatives. Third, the measure should be able to
capture cross-sectional as well as time series variation. Finally, the studied sample should
be as large and representative as possible as well as not being limited to listed companies
if inference shall be made that also holds in a continental European context.
2.3 Categorization of financing conditions and sample
construction
2.3.1 Firms’ self-assessment of financing conditions
This study combines a survey based financial constraints measure and publicly available
balance sheet data to assess the capability of commonly applied indicators to measure
financial constraints. Both pieces of information are linked in the German EBDC Busi-
ness Investment Panel.1 Within this merged data set firms’ financial constraint status is
obtained from the German IFO Investment Survey, which focuses on the quantification of
firms’ current investment activities and future investment plans as well as on their quali-
tative assessments of certain investment determinants. The semi-annual survey has been
conducted in spring and autumn by the IFO Institute since 1955. It comprises firms across
all industries within the manufacturing sector, aiming to provide representative aggregate
figures. The survey questions on firms’ self-assessment of their investment determinants
were introduced in fall 1989 and were subsequently surveyed at annual frequency. How-
ever, due to disclosure considerations, the sample ends in 2009. Respondents are surveyed
repeatedly and their number is held fairly constant at about 1,500. On aggregate, the sur-
veyed firms account for about one quarter of total investment expenditures in the German
manufacturing sector. Assessing the representativeness of the survey, Bachmann and Zorn
(2013) show that aggregate investment figures derived from the survey are comparable to
the aggregate investment statistics obtained from national accounts.
In order to derive a firm and time specific indicator of financial constraints, we rely
on the firms’ qualitative assessment of their investment determinants. Specifically, at
1For a description of the data set, see Ho¨nig (2010).
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the end of each year firms are asked to separately assess the impact of six determinants
on their physical investment expenditures for that year. The six determinants comprise:
(1) current and expected sales, (2) financing conditions, (3) expected profitability, (4)
technical factors, (5) economic policy, and (6) others. Answers are given on an ordered scale
consisting of five categories, ranging from (1) strongly favorable, over (2) weakly favorable
and (3) neutral, to (4) weakly adverse and (5) strongly adverse. According to the survey
question, firms report financing conditions rather than financial constraints. However, the
two concepts can be mapped. Compared to a dichotomous financial constraint indicator,
the two adverse financing conditions categories, (4) and (5), represent financial constraints,
while unconstrained firms should select themselves into the remaining categories, (1) to (3).
Also note that given the explicit reference of the survey question to the impact realization
on investment, reported financial constraints can be considered as actually binding. For
the sake of clarity, in the following we will rather refer to financing conditions than financial
constraints. Referring to financial constraints, however, we assume the mapping outlined
above.
In addition to the financial constraint status, two of the other investment determinants
are utilized in the subsequent analysis; namely, firms current and expected sales as well as
the profitability of potential investment projects. Firms own assessments of the influence
of these two determinants on their investment decision directly measure their future invest-
ment opportunities, and thus provide an appealing alternative to conventional q measures.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the KZ index has been criticized based on its reliance on
average Tobin’s q, measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of
assets, which is potentially observed with considerable measurement error (Erickson and
Whited 2000). However, this measurement error might bias the coefficient estimates of
the remaining variables comprised in the KZ index, especially those of cash flows and cash
holdings. More specifically, estimates might be driven by the accelerator effect rather than
the desired liquidity effect.
2.3.2 Sample construction and descriptive statistics
The EBDC Business Investment Panel links the IFO Investment Survey to firms’ balance
sheet information obtained from the commercial databases Amadeus and Hoppenstedt.2
2Amadeus is a product of the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing GmbH. It covers annual accounts
and investment data of disclosing companies in the German Commercial Register with a bank credit index
of a maximum of 499, according to the Creditreform Association. The Hoppenstedt Accounting Database
is a product of the Hoppenstedt Business Information GmbH and gives detailed information on financial
51
The merged data set comprises 613 firms and 2,961 firm-year observations for which all
relevant balance sheet items and survey data are available.
Table 2.1: Summary of annual financing conditions 1989-2009 in %
Strongly Strongly
favorable Favorable Neutral Adverse adverse
financing financing financing financing financing
Year conditions conditions conditions conditions conditions N
1989 3.3 17.6 68.1 6.6 4.4 91
1990 4.0 11.0 63.0 19.0 3.0 100
1991 1.8 8.3 58.7 22.9 8.3 109
1992 2.0 8.8 50.0 30.4 8.8 102
1993 2.0 12.2 61.2 17.3 7.1 98
1994 2.7 16.4 56.4 19.1 5.5 110
1995 4.1 13.2 66.9 13.2 2.5 121
1996 2.6 19.8 58.6 13.8 5.2 116
1997 3.3 15.0 65.0 12.5 4.2 120
1998 2.5 17.5 69.2 9.2 1.7 120
1999 3.6 14.4 69.4 8.1 4.5 111
2000 0.8 12.4 70.2 13.2 3.3 121
2001 0.8 10.7 61.8 19.1 7.6 131
2002 1.5 9.7 60.4 20.9 7.5 134
2003 0.8 6.8 64.7 21.1 6.8 133
2004 1.8 11.8 64.5 16.0 5.9 169
2005 1.6 9.9 71.2 12.6 4.7 191
2006 2.0 13.8 74.0 7.9 2.4 254
2007 2.5 15.2 66.0 15.7 0.5 197
2008 1.6 10.5 71.1 15.8 1.1 190
2009 1.6 7.0 57.2 22.6 11.5 243
Total 2.1 12.2 64.8 15.9 5.0 2961
The table presents cross-sectional averages of firms’ assessments of their financing conditions over time.
The sample is restricted to the 2,961 firm-year observations for which all subsequently analyzed survey
and balance sheet information is available. N denotes the number of respondents for each year.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of firms’ assessments of their financing conditions over
time. The table illustrates certain sample features: The availability of financial statements
statements of German companies. Together, the two databases comprise almost all final statements of
German firms published since 2005, while historical information for large firms dates back to 1987. The
matching of the balance sheet information with the survey data is performed on the names and physical
addresses of the firms. See Ho¨nig (2010) for details.
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from commercial providers increases over time. This is reflected by a time trend in firm-year
observations in the sample. Moreover, the table shows both considerable cross-sectional and
time series variation. Over the whole sample period, an average of 20.9% of the firms report
that financing conditions have adverse effects on their investments, while 14.3% report
favorable and 64.8% neutral financing conditions. The number of adverse assessments is
particularly pronounced during the recession following the German reunification boom in
the early 1990s, after the burst of the “Dot-com Bubble” in the early 2000s, and in 2009
in the follow-up of the financial crisis of 2007/08.
Turning to the balance sheet characteristics, Table 2.2 shows summary statistics of the
pooled sample of the 2,961 firm-years grouped by firms’ assessments of their financing
conditions. The selection of variables reflects the indicators considered by Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) in order to assess the validity of the KZ and the WW index. However,
Tobin’s q is an exception. Since our sample mainly consists of non-listed firms, we do not
observe the market value of firms’ assets. In contrast, we rely on self-assessed and forward
looking sales and profitability measures to account for firms’ investment opportunities.
In order to make our sample comparable to the original studies, we follow the variable
definitions applied by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Whited and Wu (2006),
which were subsequently adopted by Hadlock and Pierce (2010).3 In addition, we apply
an outlier adjustment that is aimed at ensuring comparability to the original studies.4
3Specifically, we compute two alternative cash flow indicators. In both cases, cash flow is defined
as net income plus depreciation. However, in the first case, Cash flow/K, cash flow is normalized by a
firm’s capital stock in terms of its tangible assets at the beginning of the year, while in the second case,
Cash flow/assets, it is scaled by lagged total assets. Furthermore, Cash/K refers to holdings of cash and
cash equivalents including securities and is scaled by lagged tangible assets. There are also two alternative
leverage ratios. On the one hand, Debt/total capital is defined as the sum of short-term and long-term debt
over the sum of short-term and long-term debt plus equity, and on the other hand, Long-term debt/assets
refers to long-term debt over total assets. Dividends/K is defined as dividends paid out normalized by
lagged tangible assets. The Industry sales growth is computed as the average year on year growth rate
of real sales within the two digit sub-categories of the German standard industry classification, while
Sales growth refers to firm-specific real sales growth. Investment/K denotes expenditures on physical
investments scaled by lagged tangible assets. Total amounts of Sales, Tangible assets, and Total assets
are reported in inflation adjusted year 2005 euros, obtained by deflating nominal values with the German
producer price index. Moreover, Age is computed as the difference between the current year and the year
of incorporation. Note however, that Hadlock and Pierce (2010) measure firm age in the number of years
the firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat. Finally, assessments of Sales and Profit are
coded as dummy variables indicating strongly favorable, favorable, neutral, adverse, and strongly adverse
impacts on investment spending respectively.
4In particular, the two leverage ratios are set to one if they exceed the value of one or if a firm is in
negative equity. Firm-year observations with negative leverage ratios are deleted. Continuous variables
are winsorized at both tails, at 2% and 98%, except those that are naturally bounded at zero and except
Cash flow/K, which is winsorized at a value of five.
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However, we find one considerable difference in sample definitions between Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) and the two earlier studies. In contrast to Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo
(2001) and Whited and Wu (2006), Hadlock and Pierce (2010) do not restrict their sample
to firms showing positive sales growth. Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Whited
and Wu (2006) exclude these firms in order to focus their analysis on firms that face
constraints to obtain external finance rather than those being in financial distress. In
the case of our sample, this restriction is binding for about one third of the firm-years,
indicating a potentially substantial source of bias. Therefore, in the following, we report
estimation results for the correspondingly restricted as well as for the unrestricted sample.
Assessing the comparability of the sample with our main reference study, Hadlock and
Pierce (2010), we find a high degree of similarity. The sample employed by Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) comprises 1,848 Compustat firm-years representing 356 listed firms operating
during the 1995 to 2004 period, while the average size across firm-years is 783 million
inflation adjusted year 2004 dollars. Evaluated by this measure, firm-years in our sample
seem to be quite similar showing a book value of 764 million inflation adjusted year 2005
euros. In addition, in both samples the firm size distribution is heavily skewed with the
median of total assets being about 8 times smaller than the mean. The similarity in firm
size is likely driven by the construction of our sample. Specifically, conditioning on the
availability of balance sheet information as well as potential survivorship bias in the IFO
Investment Survey somewhat distorts our sample towards larger firms.
Comparing the financially unconstrained firms listed in columns one to three of Table 2.2
with constrained firms in columns four and five, observed differences are in line with theory.
In particular, constrained firms appear to have lower cash flows and hold less cash, work
with a higher leverage, pay less dividends, experience lower sales growth, report weaker
demand as well as less profitable investment opportunities, and finally, invest considerably
less.
2.3.3 Comparing neutral and favorable financing conditions
The summary statistics provided by Table 2.2 reveal that the relationship of firms’ self-
assessed financing conditions and certain financial constraints indicators is rather non-
monotonic. Indeed, the only variables showing unambiguously monotonic associations in
medians and means are Investment/K, Sales, and Profit. This likely reflects cyclicality
in the indicators and the financing conditions. At the same time, this pattern suggests
that reported financing conditions measure the availability of external finance rather than
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Table 2.2: Firm characteristics by self-assessment of financing conditions
Strongly Strongly
favorable Favorable Neutral Adverse adverse
financing financing financing financing financing
Indicator Statistic conditions conditions conditions conditions conditions
Cash flow/K Median 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.32 0.19
Mean 0.88 0.68 0.75 0.41 0.16
Cash flow/assets Median 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05
Mean 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.04
Cash/K Median 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.09 0.05
Mean 1.01 1.24 1.34 0.61 0.42
Debt/total capital Median 0.45 0.56 0.48 0.57 0.63
Mean 0.49 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.61
Long-term debt/assets Median 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.10
Mean 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.14
Dividends/K Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.03
Industry sales growth Median 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02
Mean 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03
Sales growth Median 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.04
Mean 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.00 -0.04
Sales Median 9.48e+07 1.18e+08 1.50e+08 1.01e+08 7.38e+07
Mean 1.83e+08 4.38e+08 8.06e+08 5.16e+08 2.44e+08
Investment /K Median 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.14
Mean 1.04 0.80 0.65 0.54 0.40
Investment growth Median 0.07 0.16 0.00 -0.11 -0.24
Mean 0.42 0.35 0.20 0.04 -0.02
Tangible assets Median 1.36e+07 2.13e+07 2.43e+07 1.96e+07 1.52e+07
Mean 3.02e+07 7.48e+07 1.15e+08 8.60e+07 4.51e+07
Total assets Median 5.12e+07 8.60e+07 1.15e+08 8.54e+07 5.26e+07
Mean 1.52e+08 4.98e+08 8.98e+08 6.55e+08 2.55e+08
Age Median 82.00 82.00 78.00 86.50 80.50
Mean 84.40 90.82 85.22 88.90 83.70
Sales (++) Mean 0.49 0.31 0.15 0.09 0.05
Sales (+) Mean 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.28 0.20
Sales (=) Mean 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.10
Sales (-) Mean 0.02 0.09 0.19 0.30 0.21
Sales (- -) Mean 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.44
Profit (++) Mean 0.43 0.27 0.09 0.06 0.03
Profit (+) Mean 0.48 0.52 0.40 0.28 0.20
Profit (=) Mean 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.08
Profit (-) Mean 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.39 0.21
Profit (- -) Mean 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.49
The table presents sample characteristics in terms of pooled medians and means of the 2,961 firm-year
observations for which all subsequently analyzed survey and balance sheet information is available. Sales,
tangible assets and total assets are reported in inflation adjusted year 2005 euros.
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the monetary policy stance. However, the relation to indicators of leverage and size even
seems to be U-shaped or inversely U-shaped respectively. Yet in the case of leverage,
non-monotonicity may well be a reflection of endogeneity as noted by several studies (see,
for instance, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 2007, Hennessy and Whited 2007, and
Almeida and Campello 2007). A similar argument applies to firms’ holdings of cash. On
the contrary, firm size is considered to be rather exogenous and to approximate for external
financial constraints arising from information asymmetries as well as from limited access
to financial markets.
Overall, summary statistics suggest a multi-dimensional relationship between reported
financing conditions and financial constraints as they are perceived in the literature. On
the one hand, firms reporting that financing conditions have no impact on their invest-
ment decisions, column three of Table 2.2, seem to be least dependent on external sources
of finance as well as to face the lowest information asymmetries. In particular, they are
considerably larger in terms of total assets and show the highest cash holdings and cash
flows relative to their investment spending. On the other hand, firms reporting either
favorable or unfavorable financing conditions are smaller in size and their assessment of
financing conditions largely reflects variation in the soundness of balance sheets. In the
light of these findings, the ordering of the financing conditions categories is at question.
Therefore, the next section reflects on the appropriateness of the ordered logistic regres-
sion framework, applied by our benchmark studies Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001)
and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), in order to assess the predictive power of the financial
constraints indicators.
2.4 Model choice
This section discusses the statistical properties of the data, which guide the choice of
our statistical framework. Based on the ordering of the self-assessed financing conditions
categories, ordered logistic regression is a natural candidate. Indeed, Lamont, Polk, and
Saa-Requejo (2001) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) apply ordered logistic regressions, but
they do not discuss whether the underlying assumptions are satisfied in their data.
We consider three alternative specifications of the ordered logistic regression model,
namely the continuation ratio, the adjacent categories, and the proportional odds model,
which are most commonly used in applied work. In order to test their respective as-
sumptions on the odds across categories, we perform standard likelihood ratio tests and
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in the last case also a Brant test (Brant 1990). However, if tested against an unrestricted
multinomial logistic regression, each of the models is rejected at the 1% significance level.5
Turning towards statistical frameworks that do not assume a specific ordering of the
dependent variable, we consider linear discriminant function analysis and multinomial lo-
gistic regression. Comparing the two, linear discriminant function analysis is surely more
powerful. However, its assumptions, multivariate normality, linearity and homoscedas-
ticity, are not met by the data.6 In contrast, multinomial logistic regression does not
make these assumptions, but relies on the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which
the Hausman-McFadden test does not reject at the 1% significance level (Hausman and
McFadden 1984).
Assuming the appropriateness of the multinomial logistic regression framework, we con-
sider the reduction of the number of equations and parameters to be estimated by collapsing
the number of categories in the dependent variable. In particular, the two tail categories,
indicating strongly favorable and strongly adverse financing conditions respectively, to-
gether comprise only 7% of the total number of firm-year observations. Accordingly, little
information is lost by collapsing the two favorable as well as the two adverse categories.7
Furthermore, this procedure increases the feasibility of an additional assumption. By
pooling firm-year observations over twenty years, we implicitly assume that the thresholds
applied by individual firms assessing their financing conditions are the same across firms as
well as over time. However, this assumption should be more appropriate if only favorable,
neutral, and adverse financing conditions are compared.
5In order to limit the impact of collinearity, we separately test the ordered logistic regression models
incorporating the full set of indicators as well as specifications comprising only the indicators of the KZ, the
WW, and the SA index respectively. In addition, we conduct the same series of tests on an alternatively
specified dependent variable, reducing the number of categories. In particular, we collapse the two favorable
as well as the two unfavorable categories. However, the restricted, ordered models are rejected throughout.
6According to the test developed by Doornik and Hansen (2008), multivariate normality is refused at
the 1% confidence level. In addition, figures 2.1 and 2.2 document considerable heterogeneity of variances
across groups.
7In addition, Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant (2013) provide guidelines for the minimal number
of observations that should be used for multinomial logistic regression. Accordingly, at least 10 cases per
category and independent variable are required, yet 20 are desired. Considering the model specification
employed throughout the subsequent empirical analysis, the strongly favorable category clearly does not
meet the minimum requirement, while the strongly adverse category marginally exceeds the threshold
in most cases except for the sub-sample requiring positive sales growth. Note however, that for the full
sample a likelihood ratio test comparing multinomial logistic regression models utilizing either the variable
set of the KZ index or that of the WW index tends to refuse the constraints imposed by collapsing the
two adverse categories but not the two favorable ones. Yet sensitivity analysis shows that the rejection is
mainly driven by differences in cash flows.
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2.4.1 Exploring non-linearity
The multinomial logistic framework relies on the assumption that the relationship of the
dependent and the continuous independent variables is linear in the logit. Prior to the
empirical analysis, we assess this assumption based on a visual inspection of the bivariate
relationships. Accordingly, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the relationships of the indicators
applied by the KZ, WW, and SA index with firms’ self-assessed financing conditions by
comparing adverse conditions with both neutral and favorable ones.
In Figure 2.1, all subsequently analyzed indicator variables are separately employed
to discriminate between adverse financing conditions, coded one, and neutral financing
conditions, coded zero, based on logistic regressions. For each indicator a scatterplot
of the partial logit residuals is shown. In order to reveal potential non-linearity in the
relationships a locally weighted scatterplot smoother (lowess) is displayed together with
the linear model prediction (Cleveland 1979). A deviation of the lowess smoother from the
model prediction hints to a violation of the linearity assumption. Figure 2.1 indicates that
the linearity assumption is not severely violated for the examined bivariate relationships.
However, somewhat considerable deviations of the lowess smoother from the linear model
fit are found for Cash flow/K, Cash/K, Long-term debt/assets, Dividends/K, and Sales
growth. Moreover, all bivariate relationships, except for Age, are found to be statistically
significant at the 5% level and regression coefficients agree in sign with those applied in the
KZ, WW, and SA index. There is only one exception, Industry sales growth, which loads
positively on the WW index, is found to be negatively associated with the probability to
report adverse financing conditions.
In contrast, stronger evidence for non-linearity in the bivariate relationships is found for
the logistic regressions separating adverse from favorable financing conditions (see Figure
2.2). In some cases even the monotonicity of the relationship is at question. This find-
ing also provides an explanation for the results presented by Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
Applying an ordered logistic regression approach and not accounting for potential non-
linearity, the authors find that estimates for Cash/K and Dividends/K flip sign across
model specifications. However, the observed patterns in the bivariate relationships should
be considered to be suggestive only. In particular, some of the indicator variables in Fig-
ure 2.2 show considerably higher dispersions and lowess smoothers seem to be more likely
driven by the impact of outliers.
Based on this evidence, we decide to allow for potential non-linearity in the modeling
approach throughout the empirical analysis. However, in order to limit the sensitivity of
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Figure 2.1: Prediction of adverse vs. neutral financing conditions
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Graphs illustrate jittered partial logit residuals obtained from logistic regressions employed to discriminate
between adverse financing conditions, coded one, and neutral financing conditions, coded zero. Individual
logistic regressions comprise the explanatory variable and a constant. Dashed lines indicate the model fit,
while solid lines are lowess smoothers of the residuals based on a bandwidth of 0.8.
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Figure 2.2: Prediction of adverse vs. favorable financing conditions
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Graphs illustrate jittered partial logit residuals obtained from logistic regressions employed to discriminate
between adverse financing conditions, coded one, and favorable financing conditions, coded zero. Individual
logistic regressions comprise the explanatory variable and a constant. Dashed lines indicate the model fit,
while solid lines are lowess smoothers of the residuals based on a bandwidth of 0.8.
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our results to the potential impact of outliers, inference on the linearity of indicator-logit
relationships is conditioned on a rigorous outlier adjustment. Specifically, we test for the
robustness of our results by winsorizing 5% at both tails of the distributions of all contin-
uous variables. Moreover, in order to parsimoniously account for potential non-linearity,
we rely on fractional polynomials as suggested by Royston and Altman (1994).8 In all
empirical specifications, we select the best non-linear transformation of the explanatory
variables following the closed-test procedure as described in Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, and
Sturdivant (2013). Specifically, we replace the linear variable by its non-linear transforma-
tion if the model fit is significantly improved according to the deviance statistic applying
a 5% significance level.9
2.5 Evaluating measures of financial constraints
Following the approach of Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we explain firms’ qualitative as-
sessments of their financing conditions by the quantitative variables employed by the KZ,
WW, and SA index. Subsequently, we infer from the signs and the significance levels of
the regression coefficients as well as from the overall model fit on the appropriateness of
the tested variables to indicate financial constraints. Moreover, we study the sensitivity of
our estimates with respect to non-linear variable transformations based on fractional poly-
nomials. In contrast to Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo
(2001), however, we do not employ an ordered logistic regression framework, but rely on
a multinomial logistic regression (see the discussion in Section 2.4). More specifically, we
simultaneously estimate two logistic regressions in order to separate the three distinct cate-
gories of our dependent variable. One discriminates between adverse and neutral financing
conditions, while the other separates adverse from favorable financing conditions.
8Fractional polynomials are an extended family of curves that comprise conventional low order polyno-
mials but cover a larger variety of shapes. In contrast to conventional high order polynomials, fractional
polynomials are also found to provide a better fit at the extreme values of the covariates. However, the
best non-linear fractional polynomial transformation is not known in advance. It has to be estimated based
on a systematic search from a set of given functions. We apply the standard set of functions suggested by
Royston and Altman (1994), which requires the estimation of two additional parameters.
9P-values are obtained by referring the difference in deviances of the non-linear and the linear model to
the χ2 distribution. As Royston and Altman (1994) point out, these p-values are approximate and rather
conservative.
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2.5.1 The KZ index
Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) create the KZ index based on the sample studied by
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and their partially qualitative measures of financial constraints.
The KZ index loads positively on Debt/total capital and Tobin’s q, and negatively on Cash
flow/K, Cash/K, and Dividends/K.10 Analyzing a sample of mainly non-listed firms, we
do not obtain the market value of assets in order to compute q measures. Instead, we
approximate firms investment prospects and potential accelerator effects by two qualitative
indicator variables: Sales and Profit . The two variables are based on firms’ self-reported
assessments of the impact of current sales and future sales expectations as well as the
expected profitability of available investment projects on their investment spending. Both
variables are measured on a five category scale ranging from a strongly favorable to a
strongly adverse impact assessment.
Table 2.3 reports regression results. Comparing our estimates with those reported by
Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we find certain similarities. In particular, Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) find only two out of the five components, cash flow and leverage, to be consistently
significant with a sign that agrees with the KZ index. This finding is supported by our es-
timates for the logistic regression discriminating between adverse financing conditions and
neutral financing conditions, presented in the top panel of Table 2.3. Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) report that for two additional components, Tobin’s q and dividends, the coefficients
flip signs across estimated models and are in many cases insignificant, particularly for the
dividend payments. In our sample, only in one out of six regressions dividends are signif-
icant, while estimates on Tobin’s q might be less comparable. Finally, cash holdings load
negatively on the KZ index while showing generally positive and significant coefficients in
the models estimated by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). According to our results, cash holdings
flip sign only once, yet the coefficient is neither significant nor negative throughout.
Section 2.4 presents bivariate regressions providing evidence for potential non-linearity.
Therefore, we assess the linearity assumption of the logistic regression model by fitting
non-linear transformations of the continuous explanatory variables (factional polynomials)
into our models and subsequently evaluate the non-linear against the linear model fit. Ac-
cording to the results comprised in Table 2.4, for two of the KZ indicator variables, namely
cash holdings and dividend payments, an estimated non-linear transformation significantly
10According to Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001), the KZ index is calculated as fol-
lows: - 1.002(Cash flow/K) + 0.283(Tobin’s q) + 3.139(Debt/total capital) - 39.368(Dividends/K) -
1.315(Cash/K).
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Table 2.3: Predicting financing conditions with KZ indicators (linear)
Linear Linear Linear
Sales growth > 0 Winsorize at 5%
Equation (1): Adverse vs. neutral
Cash flow/K -0.167 ** (0.084) -0.285 ** (0.121) -0.235 ** (0.113)
Cash/K -0.054 ** (0.025) -0.023 (0.033) -0.143 *** (0.045)
Dividends/K -0.280 (0.223) -0.254 (0.313) -0.846 ** (0.368)
Debt/total capital 1.413 *** (0.233) 1.007 *** (0.336) 1.303 *** (0.245)
Sales (+) 0.191 (0.190) 0.161 (0.216) 0.177 (0.191)
Sales (=) 0.214 (0.220) 0.071 (0.267) 0.201 (0.220)
Sales (-) 0.370 * (0.224) 0.077 (0.281) 0.367 (0.224)
Sales (- -) 0.435 * (0.254) 0.642 * (0.357) 0.409 (0.255)
Profit (+) 0.131 (0.226) 0.234 (0.273) 0.143 (0.227)
Profit (=) -0.192 (0.264) 0.018 (0.325) -0.164 (0.264)
Profit (-) 0.918 *** (0.250) 1.338 *** (0.309) 0.925 *** (0.251)
Profit (- -) 1.376 *** (0.283) 1.541 *** (0.393) 1.370 *** (0.284)
Equation (2): Adverse vs. favorable
Cash flow/K -0.169 (0.106) -0.396 *** (0.144) -0.230 (0.144)
Cash/K -0.063 ** (0.031) 0.001 (0.043) -0.188 *** (0.056)
Dividends/K -0.285 (0.263) -0.030 (0.364) -0.552 (0.453)
Debt/total capital 0.307 (0.326) 0.063 (0.435) 0.212 (0.343)
Sales (+) 0.444 ** (0.214) 0.453 * (0.245) 0.437 ** (0.214)
Sales (=) 0.846 *** (0.273) 0.835 ** (0.340) 0.843 *** (0.273)
Sales (-) 1.037 *** (0.310) 1.082 ** (0.419) 1.035 *** (0.311)
Sales (- -) 1.179 *** (0.423) 1.085 * (0.605) 1.172 *** (0.423)
Profit (+) 0.891 *** (0.241) 0.750 ** (0.295) 0.888 *** (0.242)
Profit (=) 1.459 *** (0.317) 1.268 *** (0.392) 1.477 *** (0.317)
Profit (-) 2.616 *** (0.328) 2.348 *** (0.401) 2.623 *** (0.329)
Profit (- -) 3.148 *** (0.467) 3.079 *** (0.738) 3.140 *** (0.467)
N 2,961 1,690 2,961
Log likelihood -2,338 -1,354 -2,328
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.087 0.113
AUROC Equ. (1) 0.724 0.718 0.732
AUROC Equ. (2) 0.828 0.789 0.830
Corr. KZ with Equ. (1) 0.756 0.760 0.838
Corr. KZ with Equ. (2) 0.869 0.667 0.834
Coefficient estimates are presented together with asymptotic standard errors, which are in parentheses; *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The reference categories for Sales and Profit are the most favorable
ones. AUROC refers to the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. Correlations with the
original KZ index are based on the four continuous variables only.
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Table 2.4: Predicting financing conditions with KZ indicators (non-linear)
Non-linear Non-linear Non-linear
Sales growth > 0 Winsorize at 5%
Equation (1): Adverse vs. neutral
Cash flow/K -0.148 * (0.078) -0.270 ** (0.117) -0.201 * (0.109)
Cash/K (1) -0.433 *** (0.106) -0.414 *** (0.145) -0.482 *** (0.143)
Cash/K (2) 0.144 *** (0.038) 0.148 *** (0.052) 0.198 ** (0.077)
Dividends/K (1) -0.001 *** (0.000) -0.297 ** (0.135) -0.445 *** (0.101)
Dividends/K (2) -0.288 *** (0.066) -0.018 ** (0.008) -0.025 *** (0.006)
Debt/total capital 1.298 *** (0.253) 0.797 ** (0.362) 1.304 *** (0.265)
Sales (+) 0.212 (0.192) 0.175 (0.218) 0.204 (0.192)
Sales (=) 0.249 (0.221) 0.082 (0.268) 0.233 (0.221)
Sales (-) 0.441 * (0.226) 0.133 (0.284) 0.440 * (0.226)
Sales (- -) 0.487 * (0.257) 0.656 * (0.360) 0.476 * (0.258)
Profit (+) 0.119 (0.227) 0.217 (0.275) 0.130 (0.227)
Profit (=) -0.189 (0.265) 0.015 (0.327) -0.166 (0.265)
Profit (-) 0.877 *** (0.252) 1.306 *** (0.311) 0.876 *** (0.252)
Profit (- -) 1.360 *** (0.285) 1.517 *** (0.394) 1.371 *** (0.285)
Equation (2): Adverse vs. favorable
Cash flow/K -0.200 ** (0.099) -0.440 *** (0.141) -0.248 * (0.141)
Cash/K (1) -0.521 *** (0.135) -0.510 *** (0.180) -0.490 ** (0.191)
Cash/K (2) 0.171 *** (0.048) 0.193 *** (0.065) 0.174 * (0.101)
Dividends/K (1) -0.001 (0.000) 0.036 (0.163) -0.145 (0.130)
Dividends/K (2) -0.121 (0.084) 0.003 (0.010) -0.007 (0.007)
Debt/total capital -0.019 (0.355) -0.349 (0.471) -0.002 (0.373)
Sales (+) 0.436 ** (0.215) 0.437 * (0.247) 0.425 ** (0.215)
Sales (=) 0.850 *** (0.274) 0.820 ** (0.341) 0.835 *** (0.274)
Sales (-) 1.047 *** (0.311) 1.055 ** (0.421) 1.040 *** (0.311)
Sales (- -) 1.175 *** (0.423) 1.031 * (0.605) 1.162 *** (0.423)
Profit (+) 0.884 *** (0.242) 0.744 ** (0.297) 0.891 *** (0.242)
Profit (=) 1.462 *** (0.317) 1.272 *** (0.393) 1.481 *** (0.317)
Profit (-) 2.605 *** (0.328) 2.374 *** (0.403) 2.613 *** (0.328)
Profit (- -) 3.114 *** (0.466) 3.056 *** (0.735) 3.125 *** (0.466)
N 2,961 1,690 2,961
Log likelihood -2,316 -1,343 -2,313
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.095 0.119
AUROC Equ. (1) 0.738 0.731 0.739
AUROC Equ. (2) 0.832 0.793 0.832
Corr. KZ with Equ. (1) 0.688 0.704 0.805
Corr. KZ with Equ. (2) 0.702 0.618 0.816
Delta deviance (linear) 42.913 22.082 29.467
P-value 0.000 0.005 0.000
Coefficient estimates are presented together with asymptotic standard errors, which are in parentheses;
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The reference categories for Sales and Profit are the most favorable
ones. AUROC refers to the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. Correlations with the
original KZ index are based on the four continuous variables only. Deviance statistics are compared to
the linear specifications in Table 2.4 by referring to the χ2 distribution (8 d.o.f.).
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improves the overall model fit.11
Figure 2.3 shows the shapes of the non-linear transformations that were found to max-
imize the deviance of the outlier adjusted model reported in column three of Table 2.4.
For low cash holdings, the non-linear transformation reveals a particularly strong negative
association with a firm’s probability to report adverse financing conditions, while the slope
becomes flatter for cash holdings that considerably exceed the value of tangible assets.
For the extensively high cash holdings, exceeding four times the value of tangible assets,
the probability to report adverse rather than neutral financing conditions even tends to
increase slightly. This pattern likely reflects the endogeneity of financial constraints and
the tendency of firms to accumulate cash out of their cash flows as documented in the
literature (see, for instance, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004). A somewhat simi-
lar pattern is found for firms’ dividend payments. Here, the negative association between
financial constraints and dividend payments is particularly strong for firms paying low or
even zero dividends, while the relationship becomes increasingly flat for higher values of
the dividend payout ratio.
Comparing coefficient estimates between the linear and the non-linear specifications
presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we find that significance levels improve dramatically if
deviating from the linearity assumption. Indeed, all of the KZ indicator variables reported
in the top panel of Table 2.4 are significant and agree in sign with the original KZ index.
However, considering the model separation of the adverse and the favorable financing
condition categories (bottom panel), only cash flows and cash holdings are significant
throughout, while dividends and leverage are not significantly different across categories.
Instead, the separation seems to be rather driven by the economic cycle as indicated by
the strongly significant sales and profit assessments.
Moreover, we assess the accuracy of our models to discriminate between financially
constrained and unconstrained firm-year observations. As a global performance measure
we calculate the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (Bamber
1975). In the context of our analysis, this area can be interpreted as the probability that
the logit of a randomly selected constrained firm will be greater than that of a randomly
selected unconstrained one. Consequently, values larger than .5 indicate a classification
performance that is better than a random classification. For our models, we find the area
11The fractional polynomials reported in Table 2.4 read as follows: Cash/K(1) = X, Cash/K(2) =
X ∗ log(X), with X = Cash/K + 2.3 ∗ 10−10 for all three model specifications; Dividends/K(1) = X−.5,
Dividends/K(2) = log(X), with X = Dividends/K+.03 in the first specification; and Dividends/K(1) =
log(X), Dividends/K(2) = log(X)2, with X = Dividends/K + .03 in the second and the third specifica-
tion.
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Figure 2.3: Estimated probability functions based on linear and non-linear logit-indicator
relationships
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The graphs compare estimated probability functions based on linear vs. non-linear logit-indicator relation-
ships for the two alternative dichotomous financing conditions indicators. Coefficient estimates are based
on the third model of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 respectively. Dashed lines represent estimated relation-
ships according to models that are linear in the logit. Solid lines show estimated relationships based on
non-linear fractional polynomials. Variables are winsorized for the upper tail of the distribution by 5%.
estimates to range from .72 to .83. In addition, although not reported, the area estimates
for the KZ variables alone range from .60 to .67. All area estimates are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% significance level according to the standard errors suggested by Bamber
(1975). Finally, we also correlate the original KZ index with the logits of each model. To
ensure comparability, again we employ only the four continuous variables that are similarly
comprised in the original KZ index as well as in our sample, excluding Tobin’s q. The ob-
tained correlation coefficients range from .62 to .87 and are highly statistically significant
throughout.
In summary, our results are in support of the validity of the original KZ index, yet
undermining the criticism expressed by Whited and Wu (2006) as well as by Hadlock and
Pierce (2010). Whited and Wu’s (2006) critique comprises two arguments. First, the KZ
66
index builds on a narrow sample of 49 low dividend firms in the U.S. running from 1970
to 1984. Accordingly, the authors question the external validity of the index coefficients
for larger firm samples and different time periods. Second, they employ the argument of
Erickson and Whited (2000), who show that Tobin’s q contains considerable measurement
error. Accordingly, it may not adequately approximate for firms’ investment opportunities
and induce bias on the coefficient estimates of the remaining KZ indicator variables. Our
results refuse this criticism. Employing a broader sample of German manufacturing firms
running from 1989 to 2009, we document three results in support of the validity of the
KZ index. First, our coefficient estimates of the KZ indicator variables are in line with
those of the original index. Second, the original index is highly correlated with the model
predictions, we derive on a similar set of indicators. Third, we find the original KZ index
to successfully discriminate between financially constrained and unconstrained firms in our
sample. Finally, our evidence does not rely on market based measures of average Tobin’s
q. Instead, we employ firms’ own assessments of their current and expected sales as well
as of the profitability of potential investment projects.
Furthermore, we provide evidence against the critique raised by Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) and shed some light on the potential sources of their contradicting results. In con-
trast to the original KZ index, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find no evidence for a significantly
negative relationship of dividend payments and financial constraints. In addition, they find
a significantly positive relationship for cash holdings, while that variable loads negatively
on the KZ index. Exploring non-linearity in the relationship of dividends and cash to the
logit of our qualitative financial constraints indicator, we find a convincing explanation
for the contradicting results. First, we show that the association of dividend payments
and cash holdings with our indicator is strongly negative for small values and becomes
almost flat for larger ones. In the case for cash, we even find evidence for a non-monotonic
association. This pattern can explain why Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) report a
significantly negative coefficient for dividends in their sample of low dividend paying firms,
while Hadlock and Pierce (2010) do not find this association. Moreover, we find dividend
and cash variables have a correlation of .4 in our sample. Given this high correlation and
the documented non-linear associations, we cannot rule out the possibility that the pos-
itive coefficients on cash holdings reported by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) are a result of
misspecification.
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2.5.2 The WW Index
Whited and Wu (2006) propose an alternative index of financial constraints exploiting
an Euler equation approach from a structural model of investment. The WW index also
builds on the Compustat universe comprising the 1975 to 2001 period and employs six
variables. It loads positively on leverage, in terms of Long-term debt/assets and Industry
sales growth, and negatively on Cash flow/assets, a Dividend dummy, indicating non-zero
dividend payments, firm size in terms of Log(assets), and on firms’ individual Sales growth.
Note that compared to the KZ index, Whited and Wu (2006) define leverage and cash flow
slightly differently. Moreover, they report the WW index to be virtually uncorrelated with
the KZ index.
We begin the analysis of the WW index by taking a look back at the plots evaluating the
bivariate relationships of the explanatory variables and the logits of the qualitative financial
constraints assessments as comprised by Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In the bi-variate regressions,
we find the slopes to be largely in line with the loadings of the WW index.12 However, in
one case the sign is reversed. Industry sales growth loads positively on the WW index, but
it shows a negative correlation with the logit of our financial constraints measures. Whited
and Wu (2006) argue that industry sales growth captures firms’ investment opportunities
more reliably than Tobin’s q. Furthermore, they expect financially constrained firms to
belong to high-growth industries but to have low sales growth themselves.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the results of the multivariate analysis of the WW index for
the linear and the non-linear case respectively.13 In line with the original index, we find
low cash flow, high leverage, and small firm size to be significantly associated with higher
probabilities to report financial constraints. Yet, the dividend dummy and individual
sales growth are only significant for the regressions discriminating between adverse and
favorable financing conditions, but not for separating adverse from neutral ones. Most
importantly, however, we find higher values of industry sales growth to be associated with
lower probabilities. The respective coefficients are negative and significant throughout.
Moreover, unreported results show that both sales growth indicators, the industry-wide
as well as the individual one, turn insignificant once we incorporate the sales and profit
12The dummy variable indicating positive dividend payments is not comprised in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
Yet, based on a logistic regression model incorporating the dummy and a constant as explanatory variables,
a strong negative association is found.
13The fractional polynomials reported in Table 2.6 read as follows: Long− term debt/assets (1) = X .5,
Long−term debt/assets (2) = X, with X = Long−term debt/assets+9.9∗10−13 for model specifications
one and three; and Long − term debt/assets (1) = log(X), Long − term debt/assets (2) = log(X)2, with
X = Long − term debt/assets+ 9.9 ∗ 10−13 in the second specification.
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Table 2.5: Predicting financing conditions with WW indicators (linear)
Linear Linear Linear
Sales growth > 0 Winsorize at 5%
Equation (1): Adverse vs. neutral
Cash flow/assets -3.878 *** (0.655) -3.984 *** (0.910) -4.420 *** (0.773)
Dividend dummy 0.007 (0.112) 0.034 (0.152) -0.002 (0.112)
Long-term debt/assets 2.332 *** (0.371) 2.371 *** (0.518) 2.721 *** (0.416)
Log(assets) -0.147 *** (0.031) -0.136 *** (0.043) -0.161 *** (0.034)
Industry sales growth -1.635 *** (0.544) -1.932 ** (0.818) -1.838 *** (0.633)
Sales growth -0.306 (0.273) -0.373 (0.457) -0.447 (0.357)
Equation (2): Adverse vs. favorable
Cash flow/assets -4.711 *** (0.869) -4.506 *** (1.136) -5.254 *** (1.020)
Dividend dummy -0.323 ** (0.148) -0.308 (0.191) -0.313 ** (0.148)
Long-term debt/assets 0.475 (0.493) 0.382 (0.645) 0.652 (0.558)
Log(assets) 0.016 (0.043) 0.053 (0.057) 0.009 (0.046)
Industry sales growth -2.168 *** (0.742) -1.200 (1.043) -2.498 *** (0.878)
Sales growth -0.728 ** (0.364) -0.543 (0.567) -1.114 ** (0.486)
N 2,961 1,690 2,961
Log likelihood -2,526 -1,439 -2,524
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.031 0.038
AUROC Equ. (1) 0.653 0.641 0.655
AUROC Equ. (2) 0.664 0.622 0.665
Corr. WW with Equ. (1) 0.592 0.504 0.581
Corr. WW with Equ. (2) 0.311 0.168 0.327
Coefficient estimates are presented together with asymptotic standard errors, which are in parentheses; *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. AUROC refers to the area under the receiver operating characteristic
curve.
indicators that we used to capture investment opportunities in the models evaluating the
KZ index. This result casts doubt on the interpretation Whited and Wu (2006) give to
this variable as well as on its capability to adequately approximate for firms investment
opportunities.
Our findings are in line with those reported by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), who charac-
terize their empirical support of the WW index as mixed. Indeed, employing the six WW
index variables individually and together in an ordered logistic regression model predicting
qualitatively assessed financial constraints, the authors find the same three variables to
have significant coefficients and to agree in sign with the WW index. Given that two of
these variables, cash flow and leverage, are essentially the same as in the KZ index, the
authors claim that the WW index has probably little advantage over the KZ index. The
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Table 2.6: Predicting financing conditions with WW indicators (non-linear)
Linear Linear Linear
Sales growth > 0 Winsorize at 5%
Equation (1): Adverse vs. neutral
Cash flow/assets -3.972 *** (0.663) -4.092 *** (0.920) -4.517 *** (0.780)
Dividend dummy -0.099 (0.114) -0.073 (0.152) -0.098 (0.114)
Long-term debt/assets (1) 3.709 *** (0.742) 0.151 *** (0.046) 3.759 *** (0.838)
Long-term debt/assets (2) -3.446 *** (1.203) 0.004 ** (0.002) -3.634 ** (1.462)
Log(assets) -0.157 *** (0.031) -0.156 *** (0.044) -0.174 *** (0.034)
Industry sales growth -1.625 *** (0.548) -1.903 ** (0.824) -1.835 *** (0.637)
Sales growth -0.264 (0.275) -0.259 (0.460) -0.400 (0.360)
Equation (2): Adverse vs. favorable
Cash flow/assets -4.824 *** (0.878) -4.614 *** (1.147) -5.351 *** (1.028)
Dividend dummy -0.332 ** (0.150) -0.320 * (0.191) -0.312 ** (0.150)
Long-term debt/assets (1) 0.525 (1.013) 0.021 (0.060) 0.088 (1.143)
Long-term debt/assets (2) -0.224 (1.643) 0.001 (0.002) 0.608 (1.992)
Log(assets) 0.013 (0.043) 0.052 (0.058) 0.008 (0.046)
Industry sales growth -2.191 *** (0.746) -1.186 (1.050) -2.512 *** (0.881)
Sales growth -0.721 ** (0.367) -0.530 (0.569) -1.104 ** (0.489)
N 2,961 1690 2961
Log likelihood -2510 -1429 -2510
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.037 0.044
AUROC Equ. (1) 0.665 0.653 0.666
AUROC Equ. (2) 0.665 0.621 0.665
Corr. WW with Equ. (1) 0.542 0.447 0.540
Corr. WW with Equ. (2) 0.312 0.171 0.329
Delta deviance (linear) 33.022 18.981 18.981
P-value 0.000 0.001 0.000
Coefficient estimates are presented together with asymptotic standard errors, which are in parentheses; *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Deviance statistics are compared to the linear specifications in Table
2.6 by referring to the χ2 distribution (4 d.o.f.).
only new variable that they find to offer marginal additional explanatory power is firm
size, with smaller firms being more likely to be constrained.
Again, we assess the accuracy of our models based on the WW index variables to dis-
criminate between financially constrained and unconstrained firm-year observations. Ac-
cording to the area under the ROC curve estimates, ranging from .62 to .67, all models
still significantly outperform a random classification. However, area estimates as well as
the pseudo R2 statistics are considerably smaller compared to those reported for the KZ
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index variables. In addition, we also find the correlation of our model predictions with the
original WW index to be rather low, ranging from .17 to .59. In particular, the predic-
tions obtained from the regression models discriminating between adverse and favorable
financing conditions are found to be poorly approximated by the original index. Although
not reported here, we also compute the area under the ROC curve measure employing the
original WW index to classify adverse and favorable financing conditions. Indeed, our re-
sults reveal that in this case the original WW index is not significantly better than flipping
a coin. Given that we found adverse and favorable financing conditions to be adequately
separated based on firms self assessed sales and profit expectations, our doubts concern-
ing the adequate approximation of investment opportunities through industry wide and
individual sales growth measures is substantiated.
Figure 2.4: Estimated probability functions based on linear and non-linear logit-indicator
relationships
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The graphs compare estimated probability functions based on linear vs. non-linear logit-indicator relation-
ships for the two alternative dichotomous financing conditions indicators. Coefficient estimates are based
on the third model of Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 respectively. Dashed lines represent estimated relation-
ships according to models that are linear in the logit. Solid lines show estimated relationships based on
non-linear fractional polynomials. Leverage is winsorized at both tails of the distribution by 5%.
Finally, Figure 2.4 shows the shape of the non-linear transformation of leverage that
is found to significantly increase the deviance compared to the linear model specification.
For low leverage values, we find a particularly strong positive association with a firm’s
probability to report adverse financing conditions. Yet, with increasing leverage the slope of
the curve becomes flatter. In particular, if a firm’s long-term debt to assets ratio exceeds the
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value of .25, we not longer find an association. This pattern likely reflects the endogenous
relationship of financial constraints and leverage as documented in the literature (see, for
instance, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 2007, Hennessy and Whited 2007, and Almeida
and Campello 2007). However, this finding only applies to the probability to report adverse
rather than neutral financing conditions. For discriminating between adverse and favorable
financing conditions, we neither find a linear nor a non-linear variable transformation of
leverage to yield significant results.
2.5.3 The SA Index
Based on their critique on the KZ index and their inconclusive results for the WW index,
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) advocate for a conservative approach to measure financial con-
straints. Specifically, they propose an alternative index solely relying on firms’ size and age
since they claim that these are more exogenous than the surveyed alternatives. Analyzing
the relationship of the two indicators with their qualitative financial constraints measure,
the authors find strong evidence for non-linearity. In particular, they find slopes to become
flatter after exceeding a certain threshold and low order polynomials not to appropriately
approximate for the relationship for high values of the explanatory variables. Accordingly,
they decide to winsorize both variables at a certain threshold, namely total assets at 4.5
billion year 2004 inflation adjusted dollars, which is approximately the 95% percentile of
the distribution, and age at 37 years. In addition, they employ an order two polynomial
of total assets by taking its natural logarithm to the power of one as well as to the power
two.14
In order to assess the ability of the SA index to classify financially constrained and
unconstrained firms in our data set, we employ Hadlock & Pierce’s (2010) variable trans-
formations accordingly. Minimizing the bias arising from comparisons of firms total assets
across jurisdictions, currencies and time, we also winsorize the firms total assets at the
95% percentile of the distribution, which is at 2.7 billion year 2005 inflation adjusted eu-
ros. Moreover, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) define the firm age in their sample as the current
year minus the first year that the firm has a non-missing stock price on Compustat. In the
absence of any comparable information, we define firm age as the observation year minus
the year of a firm’s incorporation. We admit that this difference possibly drives our results.
Given this constraint, we interpret this exercise as a test of the external validity of the SA
14According to Hadlock and Pierce (2010), the SA index is calculated as follows: - 0.737 Log(Min(total
assets,4.5 billion)) + 0.043 Log(Min(total assets,4.5 billion))2 - 0.040 Min(Age,37).
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Table 2.7: Predicting financing conditions with size and age
Original index Best non-linear fit Best non-linear fit
Hadlock and Pierce Hadlock and Pierce Winsorize at 5%
transformation transformation
Equation (1): Adverse vs. neutral
Log(assets) -0.548 (0.616) -0.173 *** (0.030) -0.181 *** (0.030)
Log(assets)2 0.010 (0.017)
Age37 0.001 (0.006)
Sqrt(Age37) 4.913 *** (1.604)
Sqrt(Age37)*log(Age37) -0.965 *** (0.315)
Age 0.001 (0.001)
Equation (2): Adverse vs. favorable
Log(assets) -0.826 (0.847) -0.035 (0.041) -0.037 (0.041)
Log(assets)2 0.021 (0.023)
Age37 -0.012 (0.009)
Sqrt(Age37) 2.621 (2.282)
Sqrt(Age37)*log(Age37) -0.537 (0.448)
Age -0.001 (0.001)
N 2,961 2,961 2,961
Log likelihood -2,601 -2,596 -2,600
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.011 0.009
AUROC Equ. (1) 0.575 0.579 0.574
AUROC Equ. (2) 0.514 0.517 0.515
Corr. SA with Equ. (1) -0.967 -0.873 -0.978
Corr. SA with Equ. (2) -0.346 -0.355 -0.721
AUROC SA Equ. (1) 0.426 0.426 0.426
AUROC SA Equ. (2) 0.492 0.492 0.492
Coefficient estimates are presented together with asymptotic standard errors, which are in parentheses; *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Age37 is defined as min(Age,37). AUROC refers to the area under
the receiver operating characteristic curve. For both regression equations, areas are computed for the
presented model estimates as well as for the original SA index.
index on samples of non-listed firms which rely on the real firm age instead of the time
period a firm is listed on a stock exchange.
We begin our analysis by re-estimating the SA index on our sample applying the original
variable transformations. According to our results, which are reported in the first column of
Table 2.7, all coefficients are insignificant and the coefficient of the age variable, winsorized
at 37 years, even shows the wrong sign. In addition, the correlation of the model prediction
with the original index is highly negative and the model fit is poor. We proceed by searching
for the best non-linear model fit applying fractional polynomials. The results, reported in
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Figure 2.5:
Estimated probability functions for non-linear logit-indicator relationships
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The graphs compare estimated probability functions based on estimates of the non-linear logit-indicator
relationship for the two alternative dichotomous financing conditions indicators. Coefficient estimates are
based on the second model specification presented in Table 2.7. Age is winsorized at 37 years.
column 2, reveal that the index variables significantly discriminate between adverse and
neutral financing conditions reported in our sample, however, the non-linear transformation
applied by the original index is refused by the data. Instead, the logit of the probability
to report adverse financing conditions appears to be linear in the logarithm of total assets
but non-linear in age. More specifically, we find the association of firm age and financial
constraints to be significantly stronger for young rather than for more mature firms (see
Figure 2.5). Finally, column three presents a robustness check with age not winsorized at
37 years but at both tails of the distribution by 5%. According to the results, firms size
in terms of the logarithm of total assets significantly separates firms facing adverse from
those facing neutral financing conditions. For age, however, no significant association is
found.
In summary, we find little support for the SA index. In particular, the original SA index
loadings and variable transformations are refused for our sample. In addition, the original
index shows a high negative correlation with our model predictions, and employing the
area under the ROC curve as a global classification measure, the original index does not
outperform a random classification procedure (see Table 2.7). Although we admit that the
SA index performs well on the sample of listed firms studied by Hadlock and Pierce (2010),
we caution researchers to apply the index in order to identify financially constrained firms
in deviating samples.
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2.6 Conclusion
The reliable measurement of financial constraints is key for the analysis of financial-market
imperfections as well as for the assessment of their impact on firms’ investment decisions.
Numerous measures have been proposed by the literature. However, there is considerable
debate about their relative merits.
Adding to this debate, we evaluate the extensively used KZ index as well as two more
recently proposed alternatives, the WW and the SA index. In the spirit of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997), we derive a qualitative financial constraints indicator, building on firms’
self-reported assessments of their financing conditions. Accordingly, we are not subject to
the critique of Hadlock and Pierce (2010), who claim that the KZ index as well as most
of the empirical literature studying financial constraints build heavily on inadequate ex-
ante sorting criteria. Especially, if they comprise the same information as the explanatory
variables employed for the subsequent analysis.
We follow Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) evaluation approach. In particular, we explain
firms’ qualitative assessments of their financing conditions by the quantitative variables
employed by the three indices. In order to infer on their validity to measure financial
constraints, we evaluate the signs and the significance levels of the regression coefficients
across different model specifications as well as the classification accuracy of the original
indices. Finally, we study the sensitivity of our estimates with respect to non-linear variable
transformations based on fractional polynomials.
Despite warranted criticism of the KZ index, we find strong evidence in support of its
reliability. Our evidence is particularly striking given the substantial differences across
samples. Indeed, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) study a narrow sample of 49 listed and
low dividend paying U.S. firms operating from 1970 to 1984. Accordingly, the stability of
their parameter estimates across samples and over time has been repeatedly questioned
(see, for instance, Whited and Wu 2006 and Musso and Schiavo 2008). Employing a
large sample of German manufacturing firms running from 1989 to 2009, our results are
thus particularly supportive for the index’s external validity. In addition, our sample
enables implicit inference on the sensitivity of the KZ index to potentially considerable
measurement error comprised in Tobin’s q (Erickson and Whited 2000). In contrast to
the original index, we utilize survey-based assessments of firms’ sales expectations as well
as of the profitability of the investment projects they face in order to control for firms’
investment opportunities. However, we find the coefficients of the remaining indicator
variables, comprised in the KZ index, to be in line with our results as well as our model
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predictions to highly correlate with the original index.
For the recently proposed WW and SA index, however, our results are less supportive.
Although we find the WW index, proposed by Whited and Wu (2006), to significantly
outperform a random classification scheme, our coefficient estimates for the comprised
indicators are not in line with the original index. In particular, for the industry sales growth
variable, which loads positively on the index, we find a significant negative association with
our survey based financial constraints indicator. Yet, Whited and Wu (2006) employ the
variable in order to capture investment opportunities (high industry sales growth) which
are supposed to be positively correlated with (binding) financial constraints.
Evaluating the SA index, suggested by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we reject the hypoth-
esis of external validity. In particular, we find the classification performance of the original
SA index to be comparable to flipping a coin. This result is surprising, given that the au-
thors claim the index to be a reasonable choice for measuring financial constraints in many
contexts after having extensively studied its robustness and out of sample performance.
Finally, we find individual coefficient estimates, and thus, the inference on the validity of
certain indicator variables to be sensitive to the linearity assumption of the indicator-logit
relationship commonly made in applied empirical work. In particular, for firms’ cash flows,
dividend payouts, and leverage ratios the association with financial constraints seems to
be particularly pronounced for smaller values. However, for increasing indicator values
associations tend to become vague.
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Chapter 3
Estimating real effects of restrictive
bank lending: bias from firms’
current states and future prospects
Based on panel data for the German manufacturing sector observed between 2003 and 2011,
we find firms to show considerably lower employment growth one year after becoming subject
to bank lending restrictions. Ruling out demand-side factors by matching either on firms’
balance sheets or additionally on monthly survey-based assessments of firms’ current states
and future prospects yields significant results for the former case but insignificant ones
for the latter. Indeed, we provide evidence that if matching on balance sheet information
only, significant bias remains. Based on our results, we challenge the focus of the related
empirical literature on backward-looking balance sheet information in order to infer on the
effects of supply-driven changes in bank lending restrictions.
3.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis is often referred to as an example of the impact of a bank lending
supply shock on real economic activity. According to this narrative, banks came under
distress and reduced their lending to non-financial firms, which caused reduced investment
activity and slowed employment growth (see, for instance, Brunnermeier (2009), Shleifer
and Vishny (2010)). However, restrictive bank lending could also have been a reflection of
deteriorating firm characteristics and business prospects that actually caused the slowdown
in economic activity. Indeed, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find evidence questioning the common
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view that a credit supply shock was a dominant causal factor for financial and investment
policies of U.S. firms during the crisis. In order to disentangle supply-side and demand-side
causes of credit contractions, to sufficiently control for firm-side factors is key. Previous
literature on this topic controls for firm heterogeneity by primarily using balance sheet
variables, which are mostly backward-looking in nature. This ignores that credit supply
is also determined by contemporaneous and forward-looking information about a firm,
which may not be sufficiently captured by its balance sheet. In this study, we address
the question of whether controlling for variables capturing firms’ current states and future
prospects affects the estimation of real effects of bank lending supply.
Based on a variety of matching estimators, we identify economically and statistically
significant effects of restrictive bank lending on firm-level employment growth when match-
ing on balance sheet variables only. However, analyzing the quality of these matching
estimators, we find that contemporaneous and forward-looking firm characteristics are in-
sufficiently balanced. Furthermore, controlling in addition for survey-based assessments of
firms’ current business situations and future expectations significantly lowers the estimated
effects, which even turn insignificant. From these results, we draw the conclusion that the
empirical literature assessing the real effects of bank lending restrictions should develop
sufficient approaches to rule out firm heterogeneity that is not captured by balance sheet
data in order to avoid overestimation of credit supply-side effects. Although less stressable,
our results also question the importance of a bank lending supply shock for the pronounced
economic downturn in Germany during the financial crisis.
Our findings are in line with an increasing literature regarding the consequences of
mis-measured fundamentals for the estimation of investment-cash flow sensitivities. While
earlier empirical research provides evidence of higher investment-cash flow sensitivities for
financially constrained firms, Erickson and Whited (2000) show that most of the stylized
facts produced by investment-cash flow regressions are artifacts of measurement error in
marginal q. Subsequent research by Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner (2006) sheds light on
this measurement error. Employing earnings forecasts from security analysts to control for
fundamentals, the authors find cash flow to be uncorrelated with investment for firms that
were classified as being liquidity constrained in previous studies relying on Brainard-Tobin
average q. This paper shows that analog error in the measurement of firms fundamen-
tals, specifically firms’ current states and future prospects, biases the estimates of firms’
sensitivity to supply-driven bank lending restrictions.
Our analysis is based on a sample of German manufacturing firms from the “EBDC
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Business Expectations Panel” observed between 2003 and 2011. This data set links the
monthly Ifo Business survey to balance sheet information. The survey provides panel data
on firms’ perceptions of bank lending supply, from which we derive a treatment variable
indicating that a firm has experienced restrictive bank lending. The survey data also
contain year-on-year employment growth rates at the firm-level that are rarely covered by
comparable balance sheet data sets. When estimating the effect of restrictive bank lending
on employment growth, we rule out firm heterogeneity using a combination of balance
sheet data and firms’ monthly appraisals of their current business situations and future
expectations, which they reveal in the Ifo Business Survey.
Consequently, our main contribution to the existing empirical literature stems from
these unique data. First, we use a direct survey-based measure of bank lending restrictions.
Second, we provide quantitative estimates of the effect of bank lending restrictions on firm-
level employment stocks. Third, we analyze the sensitivity of our estimates with respect
to conditioning on rich and timely data on firms’ own assessments of their current state
and future prospects when the restriction occurs. More specifically, the high frequent panel
structure of our data set allows us to identify the timing of a firm’s experience of restrictive
bank lending on a monthly basis, whereas previous studies are limited to annual data.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the literature
concerning the impact of credit supply-side shocks on real economic activity, specifically
focusing on comparable firm-level studies and the control variables they use. The empirical
strategy is laid out in Section 3.3, while Section 3.4 describes the data set, defines the
treatment, and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 presents results for least squares
estimation and for a variety of matching estimators as well as sensitivity analysis with
respect to the set of covariates. Section 3.6 lays out robustness exercises and Section 3.7
discusses the role of the financial crisis. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Literature
Using macroeconomic data, Bernanke (1983) was the first to present empirical evidence for
the impact of the collapse of the financial system on borrowers, and therefore the economy
as a whole, during the Great Depression from 1930 to 1933. Theoretical models introducing
such a bank lending channel were developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Kashyap and Stein (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
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and more recently by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
In the empirical literature, credit supply-side effects on real economic activity were
estimated based on different approaches – either with a macro or micro focus. Using
macro-data, empirical studies by Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Chava and Purnanan-
dam (2011) identify exogenous shocks to banking systems and assess their real economic
effects. Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) and Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan
(2008) follow a similar approach to Rajan and Zingales (1998), showing that banking crises
adversely affect growth at the sector-level.
Another strand of research that is closer to the approach followed in this paper tries
to identify the effects of restricted credit supply at the firm-level. In order to identify
bank-side effects, most studies either rely on a set of firm characteristics to rule out firm
heterogeneity or use exogenous sources if there is a variation in credit supply.1 Khwaja
and Mian (2008) analyze the impact of liquidity shocks on banks in Pakistan and on the
default probability of firms that simultaneously borrow from differently impaired banks.
The few firm characteristics covered comprise size, location, and political connectedness.
However, they draw their main conclusions from within-firm comparisons, thereby con-
trolling for firm-specific changes in credit demand. For Japan, Gan (2007) finds that a
firm’s investment depends on the real estate exposure of its top lender during the collapse
of the Japanese land market in the early 1990s. He controls for firms’ credit demand and
creditworthiness as well as for their selection of the lending bank using firms’ Tobin’s q,
cash flow, cash stock, land holdings, recent land purchases, and leverage.
Focusing on the financial crisis, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) use the crisis as
a negative supply-side shock and analyze its effect on firms’ investments. They control
for firms’ Tobin’s q, cash flow, cash holdings, and debt. Following a different approach,
Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012) compare investments of firms with
debt maturing just before the outbreak of the financial crisis to investments of firms without
maturing debt by using a matching approach. They use the same variables as Duchin,
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) and further match on industry and rating categories. Chodorow-
Reich (2013) constructs a data set of bank relationships for a sample of U.S. firms and finds
a significant impact of bank health on employment for small and medium-sized firms, but
not for large ones. He controls for firms’ current borrowing pattern, firm size, age, and
access to public bond markets.
Finally, an increasing body of literature analyzes how bank-side factors affect loan de-
1See also an earlier review of existing research strategies with a comprehensive list of classification
indicators by Musso and Schiavo (2008)
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cisions or loan rates (e.g. Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´, and Saurina (2012), Popov and Udell
(2012), Santos (2011), and Ashcraft (2006)). Although they do not consider firms’ be-
havioral responses to credit restrictions, their inference might well be sensitive to the
incorporation of indicators of firms’ current business situations and future expectations as
additional firm-side determinants of loan prices and volumes apart from balance sheet data
and credit ratings.
This review of the empirical literature shows its reliance on balance sheet data to control
for firm-level heterogeneity. Primarily due to data limitations, complementary indicators
of firms’ current business situations or future expectations are not considered. However,
there is indeed one study that does so and is thus close to this work. Campello, Graham,
and Harvey (2010) use survey data to analyze the impact of credit constraints on planned
employment cuts and capital expenditures, among other variables. At first, they control for
firm heterogeneity using size, ownership, industry, and credit rating categories. In addition,
they show that the effects of credit constraints on capital expenditures and employment
turn out slightly lower, but still significant, when contemporaneous and forward-looking
variables are also included in the matching procedure. More specifically, they consider
three dichotomous contemporaneous and forward-looking variables: firm’s self-predicted
profitability status for 2008, a self-predicted dividend payout status for the same year, and
a self-assessment of the firms’ long-term growth prospects. However, Campello, Graham,
and Harvey (2010) rely on cross-sectional data obtained in the fourth quarter of 2008, right
after the bankruptcy of Lehman. Therefore, apart from other differences, their results
may not be comparable to those obtained from the panel data utilized in this study for
two reasons. First, to rule out endogeneity we match on firm-level current states and
future prospects that are observed right before the bank lending restriction initially occurs.
Second, we analyze the impact on actually realized employment figures after one year, while
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) study the impact on investment and employment
plans at the turmoil of the crisis, when uncertainty was at its peak.
3.3 Empirical strategy
To identify the effects of bank lending restrictions on firm-level employment growth, we
estimate a treatment effects model using a matching estimator. For every firm in our panel
data set, we observe whether a firm i is experiencing restrictive bank lending in month t
(Restrictedi,t) and we measure post-treatment year-on-year employment growth one year
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later (∆Empli,t+12). If bank lending restrictions were randomly assigned to firms, observed
post-treatment differences in employment growth between restricted and unrestricted firms
could be interpreted as effects of bank-side factors. However, the assignment depends
on firms’ credit demand and creditworthiness, which also affect the observed difference
in employment growth. The direction of the resulting bias is ambiguous, however. On
the one hand, the effects of bank-side factors could be overstated because firms in dire
straits (e.g. due to a product demand shock) are more likely to experience restrictive bank
lending and are also likely to have lower employment growth rates. On the other hand, the
difference could also understate the effects of bank-side factors if firms with large growth
potentials were more likely to experience restrictive bank lending due to risk or asymmetric
information (e.g. young, innovative firms or SMEs).
Therefore, the identification of effects of bank-side factors requires controlling for firm
heterogeneity. We do so by setting up a quasi-experimental setting using a matching
estimator.2 More precisely, we compare restricted firms to matching firms that are unre-
stricted, but otherwise similar to the restricted firms in terms of characteristics predicting
the experience of restrictive bank lending. The treatment can then be considered ran-
domly assigned conditional on the characteristics on which firms are matched and the
average difference in employment growth rates between restricted firms and unrestricted
matching firms provides an estimate of the real effects of bank lending supply. Compared
to the standard ordinary least squares approach, the semi-parametric matching approach
applied in this study relies on less restrictive identifying assumptions. More specifically, we
balance the distribution of covariates, Xi,t−1, between restricted and unrestricted firms and
assure a common support. This reduces the risk of misspecification of the functional form
of (E[∆Empli,t+12|Xi,t−1])including the control for observably impact heterogeneity and
avoids counter factual comparisons based on extrapolations outside the common support
of the covariates’ distributions.
We combine exact matching and propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983) because the large number of firm characteristics, including continuous variables,
inhibits the identification of matching firms that are identical with respect to all charac-
teristics as required by the approach based on exact matching. The propensity score is
defined as the predicted probability of experiencing restrictive bank lending given a set of
pre-treatment firm characteristics, Xi,t−1:
2This approach is also used in other studies (e.g. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010), Almeida,
Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012)).
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p(Xi,t−1) = Pr(Restrictedi,t | Xi,t−1). (3.1)
Assuming that all predictors of Restrictedi,t are included in Xi,t−1, restrictive bank
lending can be considered randomly assigned so that it is independent of the outcomes
(∆Empl0,i,t+12) and (∆Empl1,i,t+12) given pre-treatment firm characteristics Xi,t−1 and
(∆Empl0,i,t+12,∆Empl1,i,t+12) ⊥ Restrictedi,t | p(Xi,t) (3.2)
holds. Comparing each restricted firm to unrestricted ones with a similar propensity
score thus provides an estimated treatment effect that is close to the one derived from
an experimental setting (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) in which restrictive bank lending is
randomly assigned. The identifying assumption, however, hinges on the choice of the
variables comprised in Xi,t−1. In this respect, our study provides a major contribution
to the existing literature by considering a broader set of variables accounting for balance
sheet information, as well as firms’ current business situations and future expectations.
However, what drives the exogenous variation in the assignment of bank lending re-
strictions if firm characteristics are identical? There are two valid arguments for a setting
in which firms differ in their availability of bank credit even though they are similar in
other characteristics. First, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) state that one symptom of credit
rationing is the possibility that one firm is granted bank credit while the credit applica-
tion of another similar firm is rejected. In Section 3.4.2 we show that a large number of
firms receive the treatment of restrictive bank lending during the financial crisis. During
this period, uncertainty about firms’ business environment increased, severing asymmetric
information between firms and banks, and potentially inducing randomly assigned bank
lending restrictions given firm characteristics.
Second, heterogeneity in firms’ bank relationships can explain differences in credit sup-
ply between otherwise similar firms. This is the case if one firm’s relationship bank restricts
lending, but the relationship bank of another similar firm does not, inducing a random
assignment of restrictive bank lending. There is a body of literature in support of this ar-
gument showing that banks with different characteristics, such as size and capitalization,
are differently inclined to transmit monetary policy changes to the real sector3 and that
banks differed in their lending behavior during the financial crisis4. This is complemented
3E.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000); Kishan and Opiela (2000); Gambacorta (2005); Kishan and Opiela
(2006); Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´, and Saurina (2012).
4E.g. Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010); Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010); Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen
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by the fact that if a firm experiences restrictive lending from one bank, simply addressing
another one is not necessarily an option. As Sharpe (1990) shows, it can be costly to bor-
row from outside an existing bank relationship. Empirical evidence lends support to the
argument that relationships to banks that were hit by the financial crisis had a negative
impact on firms (Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner, 2012; Chodorow-Reich,
2013; Santos, 2011). On the contrary, it could of course be argued that a firm’s choice of
its relationship to a bank is not random, but driven by certain firm characteristics (see,
for example, Hainz and Wiegand (2013)). However, the broad set of firm characteristics
on which we match firms to randomize the assignment of restrictive bank lending should
also help to randomize firms’ choices of bank relationships.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Databases
In the related literature the vast majority of approaches identifying real effects of bank
lending restrictions rules out firm heterogeneity primarily by controlling for firm size, age
and balance sheet data. Balance sheet variables provide accurate measures of a firm’s
financial condition, yet they are rather backward-looking and limited to hard information.
In the determination of firms’ credit demand as well as of banks’ assessments of firms’
creditworthiness, however, contemporaneous and forward-looking information (e.g. from
order books, interim financial statements or business plans) might also be relevant. To ap-
proximate such information, we use data from the German “EBDC Business Expectations
Panel”, which offers panel data on firms’ perception of bank lending supply, annual employ-
ment growth, and a broad set of firm characteristics including balance sheet information
and survey-based appraisals of firms’ current business situations and future expectations.
The full set of variables used in our analysis is described in Table 3.1.
The “EBDC Business Expectations Panel” links firms’ balance sheets from the Bureau
van Dyk Amadeus database5 and the Hoppenstedt database6 to panel data from the Ifo
(2011).
5The Amadeus database contains balance sheet data and other firm-specific information for European
firms and covers approximately one million mainly unlisted German firms. Its primary source for Germany
is the Creditreform database.
6Hoppenstedt is a leading provider of balance sheet data for German firms. The public press and
commercial registries are among its main data sources. It has almost full coverage of publicly available
final statements in Germany.
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Table 3.1: Variable descriptions
Variable Description Frequency
Treatment
Restricted Change in perception of bank lending from Varying*
“accommodating” or “normal” to “restrictive”
Size and growth
Empl Number of employees at company-level Annual
∆Empl Year-on-year growth rate in number of employees Annual
Growth Positive year-on-year growth rate Annual
Balance sheet data
Equity ratio Equity to total assets Annual
ROA Operating profit to total assets Annual
Fixed assets Fixed assets to total assets Annual
Coverage ratio Operating profit to interest expenses Annual
Cash Cash holdings to total assets Annual
Current situation
State (+) Appraisal: Current business situation good Monthly
State (=) Appraisal: Current business situation satisfactory Monthly
State (-) Appraisal: Current business situation unsatisfactory Monthly
Orders (+) Appraisal: Stock of orders relatively high Monthly
Orders (=) Appraisal: Stock of orders satisfactory or enough Monthly
Orders (-) Appraisal: Stock of orders too small Monthly
Short-time Currently working short-time Quarterly
Export Firm is exporting Quarterly
Future expectations
State exp (+) Expecting improvement of business over next 6 months Monthly
State exp (=) Expecting no change of business over next 6 months Monthly
State exp (-) Expecting worsening of business over next 6 months Monthly
Empl exp (+) Expecting increasing employment over next 3 months Monthly
Empl exp (=) Expecting no change in employment over next 3 months Monthly
Empl exp (-) Expecting decreasing employment over next 3 months Monthly
Short-time exp Expecting to work short-time during next 3 months Quarterly
Headcount (+) Too few employees for demand over next 12 months Quarterly
Headcount (=) Enough employees for demand over next 12 months Quarterly
Headcount (-) Too many employees for demand over next 12 months Quarterly
Notes: * As of November 2008, the question regarding bank lending behavior is asked monthly, although
only in March and August of each preceding year.
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Business Survey. The Ifo Business Survey is a monthly survey which asks 3,600 plants
from the German manufacturing sector for an appraisal of their current business situations
and expectations for future business. It was launched in 1949 to provide the basis for the
Ifo Business Climate Index, a timely measure of economic activity. For this purpose, the
Ifo Institute continuously ensures that the panel of firms is representative of the German
manufacturing sector.
When linking annual balance sheet and monthly survey data, which is done based on the
name and postal address of the firms, we allow for alternative fiscal years. More specifically,
fiscal years of some firms in our sample do not coincide with calendar years. Due to the
monthly frequency of our data, we can allow for alternative fiscal years by linking the most
recent balance sheet to monthly observations. We thereby assume that a firm’s balance
sheet for the preceding fiscal year is made available to banks immediately at the end of the
fiscal year.
3.4.2 Treatment definition
Based on the panel structure of our data we derive both a firm and time-specific treatment
variable indicating that a firm experiences a change in bank lending supply, which is not
experienced by a control group of firms. In the Ifo Business Survey firms are asked how they
perceive banks’ willingness to lend to firms. Possible appraisal categories are “restrictive”,
“normal”, and “accommodating”. This enables us to measure a change in credit supply to
a firm directly and to analyze the subsequent employment development.
Firms that we refer to as restricted in a certain month complete a transition from
reporting “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending in one month, t-1, to reporting
“restrictive” bank lending in the next month, t. A firm is defined as unrestricted in t when it
reports “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending in t-1 and does not switch to reporting
“restrictive“ bank lending in t. Furthermore, we rule out bias from potential previous
treatments by requiring that both restricted and unrestricted firms have not reported
“restrictive” bank lending in the previous twelve months. This conservative treatment
definition is the basis for identifying the effects of restrictive bank lending, but comes at
the cost of using only a fraction of the firms in the data set.
After conditioning on the availability of all control variables, Xi,t−1, our setup comprises
a sample of 329 treated and 4,950 untreated potential matching firm-month observations.
Figure 3.1 provides the distribution of treated observations over time. The number of
treated firms increases sharply during the wake of the financial crisis.
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Figure 3.1: Number of treated firms over time
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Notes: The graph shows the total number of treated firms by quarter for which all relevant control variables
are available; a firm is treated if it reports “restrictive” bank lending while having reported “normal” or
“accommodating” bank lending in the previous 12 months; from 2003 to 2008, treatments can only occur
in the second and third quarter because firms are surveyed on bank lending in March and August only, and
the treatment is assumed to occur in the month right after “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending
was reported the last time.
For identification, we have to make an assumption about the exact timing of the treat-
ment. As of November 2008, the question is asked on a monthly basis, which allows the
exact specification of the treatment month t as the month in which the firm reports re-
strictive bank lending for the first time. For 2003 to 2008, however, the question is only
asked twice a year, in March and August. If, for example, a firm reports normal or ac-
commodating bank lending in March and restrictive bank lending in August, it remains
unclear whether the shift occurred in August or at any time between March and August.
For our analysis, we assume the treatment month t to be the month right after the firm
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reports “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending the last time. This ensures that our
control variables, which are drawn from t-1, are measured in a month during which the
firm is definitely untreated and not already affected by bank lending restrictions. We
could alternatively assume that the treatment occurs in the month during which the firm
reports “restrictive” bank lending for the first time. Our empirical results, however, are
not sensitive to the altering of this assumption.
Another pitfall of our measurement of bank lending restrictions is driven by the wording
of the corresponding survey question. Here, a firm is asked for its perception of bank lending
supply to firms in general and not to the surveyed firm in particular. Given that all of
the other survey questions unambiguously refer to firm specific assessments, we have good
reason to assume that firms do not take the question literally, but rather answer it in the
context of the other questions, and thus provide firm-specific information. However, if firms
are taking the question literally, differences in firms’ answers at a given point in time should
still reflect difference in firms’ information sets. More specifically, we would expect firms to
answer the question based on their private information regarding their own availability of
bank credit as well as on public information (e.g. from the media or industry-peers). Given
that our matching procedure directly matches within time and industry cells, the variation
in firms’ public information sets at a given point in time should be limited and show little
structural bias. Nevertheless, firms might be misclassified. In consequence, the estimated
employment effects of restrictive bank lending would be biased downwards. Therefore, our
estimates should be considered to be conservative.
Taking account of the potential downward bias in the overall estimates, we focus the
analysis on the difference between the estimated effects with and without matching on
firms’ current business situations and future expectations in addition to size, growth and
balance sheet variables. Note that these differences should be unaffected by the potential
misclassification. Therefore, potential errors in the identification of treated firms should
not affect our main conclusion.
Turning to the consequences for the matching procedure, we reduce bias from poten-
tial misclassification by matching firms exactly within quarter and industry cells.7 It is
reasonable to assume that within quarter-industry cells, differences in firms’ public infor-
mation sets are negligible and thus differences in the perception-based treatment variable
7Please note that matching on month-industry cells turned out to be impossible due to the lack of a
sufficient number of observations in such cells. In an unreported robustness check, we also directly match
on months, while conditioning the propensity score on industry dummies. Our results are not sensitive to
this change.
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(Restrictedi,t) actually reflect differences in the firms’ own experience. Accordingly, differ-
ences in employment growth between restricted and unrestricted firms can be attributed
to firms’ own borrowing situation.
Matching firms exactly within quarters and industries further approaches a general
problem of potential time and industry-dependence of firms’ perceptions of banks’ lending
behavior. It could be the case that the definition of what firms consider as restrictive bank
lending differs over time or across industries. Exact matching on quarter-industry cells
leads to an estimator that is largely unaffected by this source of heterogeneity.
3.4.3 Control variables
To test whether matching on firms’ current business situations and future expectations
reduces selection bias and affects the estimated effects of changes in bank lending supply,
we control for firm characteristics from both balance sheets and survey data. Table 3.2
compares summary statistics of pre-treatment control variables, Xi,t−1, separately for re-
stricted firms and unrestricted potential matching firms (as defined in Section 3.4.2) to
indicate that there is a substantial selection bias.
First of all, we control for pre-treatment firm size measured by the natural logarithm
of the number of employees (log(Empl)).8 Size is widely used as a predictor of financial
constraints because large firms tend to be older and more transparent, which might facil-
itate access to credit. We also control for pre-treatment year-on-year employment growth
rates (∆Empl) because post-treatment differences in growth could simply be a follow-up
of pre-treatment differences and growth is also considered to ease firm’s access to bank
credit. Strong growth, however, could also be associated with higher risk or uncertainty
originating from firms’ business models, which could adversely affect bank lending supply
conditions.
In line with the related literature reviewed in Section 3.2, we further rule out hetero-
geneity in leverage, measured in terms of equity to assets (Equity ratio), profitability as
return on assets (ROA), the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Fixed Assets), the interest
coverage ratio in terms of operating profit over interest expenses (Coverage ratio), and cash
holdings as a share of total assets (Cash). These balance sheet variables provide valuable
information about a firm’s financial soundness and are thus widely used in the related
literature to control for firm-side factors.
To further approximate and control for a firm’s current state, also during the fiscal
8Our results are also robust to measuring firm size in terms of the natural logarithm of total assets.
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year, we rely on firms’ self assessments provided by the monthly Ifo Business Survey. Here,
firms assess their current and expected future business conditions qualitatively on a three
category scale. More specifically, firms report their overall current business situation to
be good, satisfactory, or bad (State (+), State (=), State (-)). Due to its open character,
this appraisal potentially covers a wide range of complementary information to balance
sheet data, while its timeliness is an additional advantage. A second indicator capturing
heterogeneity in firms’ current states is provided by their assessments of their current stock
of orders (Orders (+), Orders(=), Orders(-)). In Table 3.2 we only report the positive and
the negative categories of these variables for the sake of conciseness.
In addition, we control for the firms’ current short-time work status. Short-time work
is a partially subsidized labor market instrument that is widely used by German firms to
adjust their capacities to business cycle or seasonal demand fluctuations. It was widespread
and extensively applied in the German manufacturing sector during the financial crisis. A
firm working short-time signals that its workforce is currently too large. Furthermore, we
also control for the firms’ export status, that is, whether a firm is exporting its products and
thus whether it relies on foreign demand, which decreased dramatically during the financial
crisis, potentially affecting both a firm’s bank lending supply as well as its employment
growth.
Moreover, we approximate a firm’s future prospects by forward-looking firm character-
istics that are likely to predict a firm’s bank lending conditions as well as its employment
growth. Specifically, we control for a firm’s business expectations (Business expect (+),
Business expect (=), Business expect (-)), its employment expectations (Empl expect (+),
Empl expect (=), Empl expect(-)), the assessments of its current workforce relative to ex-
pected future demand (Headcount (+), Headcount (=), Headcount (-)), and its expectation
to work short-time (Short-time exp).
Comparing the descriptive statistics obtained in the pre-treatment month, t-1, we find
that restricted firms are characterized by worse financial conditions than unrestricted firms
according to balance sheet information (Table 3.2). With the exception of the equity
ratio, differences are not statistically significant due to high standard deviations in the
ratios. These are driven by extreme values, which we deal with later in our estimation
procedure. Most striking in the context of our analysis, we find significant differences in
the fraction of firms reporting negative current business situations (State (-), Orders (-)),
as well as in negative future expectations (Business expect (-), Empl expect (-), Headcount
(-)). This suggests that the matching approach might benefit from utilizing these timely
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Restricted firms Unrestricted firms p > t
(N=329) (N=4950) (X¯R = X¯U )
X¯R X
med
R S.D. X¯U X
med
U S.D.
Size and growth
log(Empl) 5.4 5.3 1.3 5.5 5.4 1.1 0.49
∆Empl 10.3% 0.0% 97.0% 65.6% 0.0% 2459.4% 0.68
Balance sheet data
Equity ratio 33.0% 30.7% 25.4% 39.1% 38.2% 21.8% 0.000
ROA -8.4% 2.9% 38.7% -8.3% 6.0% 47.5% 0.99
Fixed assets 37.3% 36.2% 20.7% 36.5% 36.4% 19.5% 0.45
Coverage ratio 16.9 1.3 4875.8 205.2 4.4 2828.1 0.27
Cash 10.1% 4.2% 12.9% 11.5% 5.8% 13.9% 0.09
Currrent situation
State (+) 21.6% 0 41.2% 25.5% 0 43.6% 0.12
State (-) 28.6% 0 45.2% 21.5% 0 41.1% 0.003
Orders (+) 10.0% 0 30.1% 13.1% 0 33.7% 0.11
Orders (-) 40.7% 0 49.2% 33.5% 0 47.2% 0.008
Short-time 13.7% 0 34.4% 14.8% 0 35.5% 0.58
Export 88.1% 1 32.4% 88.6% 1 31.8% 0.81
Future expectations
State exp (+) 16.1% 0 36.8% 19.1% 0 39.3% 0.18
State exp (-) 25.2% 0 43.5% 19.3% 0 39.5% 0.009
Empl exp (+) 6.1% 0 23.9% 6.4% 0 24.5% 0.82
Empl exp (-) 22.2% 0 41.6% 16.4% 0 37.1% 0.007
Short-time exp 19.8% 0 39.9% 20.2% 0 40.2% 0.83
Headcount (+) 5.5% 0 22.8% 6.2% 0 24.1% 0.60
Headcount (-) 26.7% 0 44.3% 20.6% 0 40.4% 0.008
Notes: The table shows means, medians and standard deviations of pre-treatment firm characteristics,
Xi,t−1, separately for treated and untreated firms; the treatment status (Restrictedi,t) is defined as de-
scribed in Section 3.4.2; p-values are reported for a two-group mean comparison t-test; no adjustment for
multiple testing; the samples only contain observations for which all firm characteristics are available in
t-1.
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contemporaneous and forward-looking indicators of firms’ bank lending conditions and
growth in order to rule out bias from pre-treatment differences in firm characteristics.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Least squares
Least squares estimates provide a natural benchmark to assess the effects of changes in bank
lending supply on firm-level employment growth with and without controlling for firms’
current business situations and future expectations. Therefore, we regress post-treatment
year-on-year employment growth rates ∆Empli,t+12, obtained after twelve months, on the
treatment status, Restrictedi,t, and four different sets of pre-treatment control variables,
Xi,t−1. To rule out the impact of extreme values in employment growth rates and balance
sheet variables, we apply the robust regression algorithm described in Hamilton (1991).
More specifically, we run an initial ordinary least squares estimation and drop all obser-
vations with a Cook’s distance larger than one and proceed by using Huber iterations as
well as biweight iterations assigning lower weights to influential observations.9 The results
are shown in Table 3.3. All regression models include time and industry dummies. To en-
sure that the estimations are comparable, we only use observations for which all variables
included in the complete setup in Estimation (4) are available. Comparing Estimations
(1) to (3), we find that including log(Empl)i,t−1, ∆Empli,t−1, and the set of balance sheet
variables virtually does not change the estimated effect of restrictive bank lending supply
on firm-level employment growth.
However, including survey-based appraisals of firms’ current business situations and
future expectations in Estimation (4) lowers the estimated effects of bank-side factors by
about one third. We take this as first evidence that for ruling out firm heterogeneity based
on firm’s size, growth and balance sheet variables only considerable bias remains.
3.5.2 Matching
In contrast to standard regression methods, matching enables further bias reduction by
balancing the covariates’ distributions between the restricted and the unrestricted firms
9In an alternative outlier robust estimation procedure, we winsorize five percent at both tails of the
distribution for all non-dichotomous variables and run ordinary least squares estimation. The results
presented in Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix are in line with the baseline, although the significance reduction
for Estimation (4) is more pronounced.
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Table 3.3: Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Restricted -0.0137*** -0.0137*** -0.0137*** -0.0092**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Size and growth No Yes Yes Yes
Balance sheet data No No Yes Yes
Current situation No No No Yes
Future expectations No No No Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0790 0.1883 0.1930 0.2487
N 5068 5068 5068 5068
Notes: The table shows weighted least squares estimations of ∆Empli,t+12 on the treatment status,
Restrictedi,t, and different sets of pre-treatment control variables, Xi,t−1; we use a robust regression
algorithm to deal with extreme values by first omitting observations with a Cook’s distance greater than
one, then by performing weighted least squares estimation based on weights from Huber iterations and
biweight iterations as described in Hamilton (1991); “Size and growth”, “Balance sheet data”, “Current
situation”, and “Future expectations” are sets of control variables as listed in Table 3.1; the four samples
only contain observations for which all control variables of Estimation (4) are available in t-1; * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
as well as by ensuring a comparison within the covariates’ common support. To estimate
the effects of supply-driven bank lending restrictions on firm-level employment growth, we
combine exact matching on time and industry dummies with propensity score matching on
a set of pre-treatment firm characteristics, Xi,t−1. In accordance with the related literature,
we first match on firms’ size, growth and balance sheets in t-1. In a second specification,
we also match on firms’ current business situations and future expectations using the
survey-based appraisals described in Section 3.4. Based on the comparison of the two
specifications, we draw conclusions on the sensitivity of the impact estimates of restrictive
lending on firm-level employment growth to the incorporation of timely indicators of firms’
current states and future prospects. Turning to the estimation of the propensity score, the
following logistic regression model is estimated separately for each quarter:
Logit(E[Restrictedi,t]) = α + β ∗Xi,t−1 + γ ∗ Industryi (3.3)
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where Restrictedi,t is a firm’s treatment status, Xi,t−1 is a set of pre-treatment firm
characteristics and Industryi is a set of industry dummies based on the two-digit German
standard industry classification (WZ 2008), while α is a constant, β and γ are parameter
vectors. Due to the limited number of observations within quarter-industry cells, the
propensity score model is estimated separately for each quarter pooling over industries but
conditioning on a set of industry-specific indicator variables. The subsequent matching
procedure, however, is performed within quarter-industry cells. Also note that in order
to account for extreme values in employment growth rates or balance sheet variables,
observations are omitted if the square root of their delta deviance influence statistic exceeds
a value of three, as suggested by Agresti and Finlay (2008).
To estimate the effects of supply-driven bank lending restrictions, we compare restricted
firms to unrestricted ones with a similar propensity score based on three alternative match-
ing estimators: a ten nearest neighbors matching, a radius matching using a caliper of 0.2σ,
with σ being the standard deviation of the propensity score in the full sample (Austin,
2011), and an Epanechnikov kernel-based matching with a bandwidth of 0.06. To account
for heterogeneity arising from the changing macroeconomic environment and from industry-
specific factors, firms are matched within quarter-industry cells. The exact matching on
time and industry also reduces potential bias arising from shortcomings in the wording of
the survey question on credit supply conditions (see Section 3.4.2). Following the matching
procedures, the derived weights are employed to estimate the treatment effects based on
weighted least squares.
Table 3.4 reports the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) for the alternative
matching procedures by sets of covariates. According to Panel A, the average treatment
effect of Restrictedi,t on ∆Empli,t+12 varies from -1.2 to -2.1 percentage points across
matching algorithms if the matching is performed on size, growth and balance sheet vari-
ables only. The estimates are statistically and economically significant throughout. Panel
B, however, provides matching estimates based on the full set of covariates. Here, esti-
mates range from -0.2 to -1.0 percentage points. Irrespective of the matching algorithm,
estimates tend to be smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. For two of the
three matching algorithms, nearest neighbor and kernel, estimates reported in Panel B
are even outside the 90 percent confidence intervals of the those in Panel A. We take this
as evidence that the omission of contemporaneous and forward-looking firm characteris-
tics induces a considerable overestimation of the impact of bank lending restrictions on
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Table 3.4: Matching estimates for ∆Empli,t+12 by sets of covariates
Panel A: Matching on size, growth, and balance sheet data only
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -2.08% -1.24% -1.64%
S.E. (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0041)
P-value 0.000 0.005 0.000
Upper bound -1.29% -0.52% -0.96%
Lower bound -2.87% -1.96% -2.32%
# of treated 190 172 183
# of matchings 1156 1342 1694
Panel B: Matching on all variables
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT 0.16% -1.00% -0.16%
S.E. (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0053)
P-value 0.79 0.10 0.76
# of treated 141 117 127
# of matchings 818 814 1012
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the treatment Restrictedi,t
on the year-on-year employment growth rate ∆Empli,t+12 based on weighted least squares estimation; in
Panel A weights are derived from matching firms based on size, growth and balance sheet data in t-1;
upper and lower bounds are reported for 90 percent confidence intervals; in Panel B weights are derived
from matching firms based on size, growth, and balance sheet data as well as on their current business
situations and future expectations in t-1; to account for extreme values, observations with a delta deviance
influence statistic larger than three are omitted; p-values are reported for a t-test of significance of the
ATT.
employment.10
Based on their balancing properties, we assess the quality of the two matching ap-
proaches employing alternative sets of covariates. In order to provide an unbiased estimate
the approaches need to substantially reduce the differences in pre-treatment firm charac-
10This result also holds for alternative outlier adjustments. In an otherwise similar matching procedure,
we winsorize five percent at both sides of the distribution of all non-dichotomous variables instead of using
the approach suggested by Agresti and Finlay (2008). In this setup, the difference between estimates
derived with and without controlling for firms’ current business situations and future expectations is
even more pronounced, and the differences are statistically significant throughout (see Table 3.A.2 in the
Appendix.)
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teristics that were documented for the unmatched sample (see Section 3.4.3). According
to Table 3.5, however, matching on size, growth, and balance sheet variables does not
sufficiently balance the survey-based indicators that were not considered in the propen-
sity score estimation. In particular, statistically significant differences remain for State (-),
Orders (-), and Headcount (-). In addition, pre-treatment differences in Orders (+), Short-
time, and Empl exp (-) are close to being statistically significant and show considerable
bias. However, additionally considering contemporaneous and forward-looking information
seems to reduce the differences substantially (right panel of Table 3.5). Drawing on these
results, we conclude that matching on balance sheet variables does not sufficiently balance
pre-treatment differences in timely measures of firms’ current states and future prospects.11
Instead, considerable bias is induced.
Turning to the overall significance of the estimated employment effects, our results seem
to cast doubt on the relevance of supply-driven effects of bank lending restrictions during
the period under consideration. Indeed, if matching on the full set of covariates, incor-
porating timely information on firms pre-treatment appraisals of their current state and
future prospects, treatment effects are found to be small in economic terms and insignif-
icant in statistical terms. Given potential shortcomings in the treatment classification as
laid out in Section 3.4.2, we nevertheless cannot rule out downward bias in our estimates
and do not stress this result accordingly.
3.6 Robustness
3.6.1 Sample selection
In contrast to the majority of studies in the related empirical literature (see Section 3.2),
the sample under consideration comprises mainly non-listed firms in the German manu-
facturing sector. Accordingly, firms are smaller and more bank dependent compared to
studies focusing on listed companies or more market based financial systems (such as in
the U.S. or the U.K.).12 Our results may therefore be more relevant for the empirical
research on European bank based economies, particularly if non-listed companies are an-
alyzed and forward-looking measures based on stock price evaluations (such as Tobin’s q)
11For the sake of conciseness, balancing statistics are presented for the radius matching only. Note,
however, that for each of the other matching algorithms significant bias in contemporaneous and forward-
looking firm characteristics is found.
12See, for example, Allen and Gale (2000) for a comprehensive review of the vast literature on compar-
ative financial systems.
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Table 3.5: Balancing properties by sets of covariates
Balance sheet only All variables
(NR = 172; NU = 1342) (NR = 117; NU = 814)
X¯R − X¯U p > t Bias X¯R − X¯U p > t Bias
(X¯R = X¯U ) (X¯R = X¯U )
Size and growth
log(Empl) -12.5% 0.28 -10.20 -2.9% 0.82 -2.39
∆Empl -1.6% 0.35 -0.09 -0.9% 0.57 -0.05
Balance sheet data
Equity ratio -2.5% 0.29 -10.60 -0.5% 0.87 -1.93
ROA -3.0% 0.52 -6.97 -2.2% 0.66 -5.10
Fixed assets -0.4% 0.84 -2.16 1.2% 0.62 5.94
Coverage ratio -13.48 0.76 -0.34 -27.46 0.84 -0.69
Cash -1.2% 0.39 -8.89 -1.0% 0.55 -7.32
Current situation
State (+) -6.1% 0.18 -14.37 -4.2% 0.41 -9.85
State (-) 9.2% 0.06 21.20 1.9% 0.74 4.36
Orders (+) -5.6% 0.13 -17.38 -2.8% 0.47 -8.70
Orders (-) 9.9% 0.06 20.62 2.3% 0.70 4.84
Short-time 5.8% 0.12 16.73 -2.2% 0.57 -6.40
Export -0.2% 0.96 -0.54 1.6% 0.62 5.02
Future expectations
State exp (+) 0.7% 0.87 1.75 -1.1% 0.78 -3.02
State exp (-) 0.7% 0.89 1.57 -2.0% 0.72 -4.83
Empl exp (+) -0.3% 0.90 -1.20 0.8% 0.72 3.27
Empl exp (-) 7.1% 0.11 18.00 0.2% 0.97 0.40
Short-time exp 1.6% 0.72 4.09 -3.6% 0.47 -9.06
Headcount (+) -0.1% 0.98 -0.33 0.6% 0.82 2.59
Headcount (-) 9.9% 0.04 23.28 2.9% 0.59 6.92
χ2(18) p > χ2 χ2(18) p > χ2
LR-test 16.29 0.70 5.13 1.00
Notes: The table shows differences in means in pre-treatment covariates, Xi,t−1, for the radius matching;
p-values are reported for two-group mean comparison t-tests and LR-tests for joint significance of all
control variables in predicting the treatment status Restrictedi,t; no adjustment for multiple testing; bias
statistics are calculated according to (X¯R − X¯U )/
√
σ2R+σ
2
U
2 .
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are unavailable.13
Turning to the matching estimator, sample selection is a potential source of bias. Se-
lected sub-samples can differ substantially across matching procedures. Therefore, any
comparison of matching estimates should also consider potential bias arising from sample
selection, specifically with regard to the sub-samples of treated firms they cover. To rule
out differences in the samples due to item non-response, we reduce our whole analysis to
firm-month observations for which all variables are non-missing, even if the matching is per-
formed on balance sheet variables only. However, there is additional reason for firms to drop
out of the sample. First, and most important, adding the indicators of firms’ current states
and future prospects more than doubles the number of matching variables. Consequently,
the curse of dimensionality is increased. This enables the identification of more appropriate
matching firms but also reduces the number of observations effectively employed by the
matching algorithms. In particular, the large number of dichotomous explanatory variables
considerably increases the probability of perfect predictions of the treatment status within
the propensity score estimation via logistic regression. As a standard procedure to ensure
numerical stability in this case, explanatory variables that perfectly predict the treatment
status along with the relevant observations are excluded from the sample. In addition,
the loss in observations is further amplified by restricting the analysis to the common sup-
port region as defined by the propensity score as well as by the direct matching within
quarter and industry cells. For the radius and the kernel matching, the sample size also
decreases according to the caliper and the kernel bandwidth respectively. Altogether, this
curse of dimensionality issue causes a considerable deviation of sub-samples employed by
the matching on the full set of covariates from the matching on growth, size, and balance
sheet information only.
To rule out that sample selection is driving our results, we compare the sub-samples
utilized by the matching procedures on the two alternative sets of covariates. We focus on
the comparison of the treated firms since their characteristics also determine the selection
13Note, however, that although being extensively employed in the applied empirical literature, Tobin’s
q and related measures might poorly approximate firm’s growth opportunities and future returns. In fact,
Erickson and Whited (2000) show that for financially constrained firms most of the stylized facts produced
by investment-q cash flow regressions are artifacts of measurement error. According to Cummins, Hassett,
and Oliner (2006), the manifold potential sources of this measurement error include non-constant returns to
scale, market power in product or factor markets, non-convex adjustment costs, putty-clay technologies,
and stock market inefficiencies. Given that the financial crisis of 2007/08 simultaneously drives bank
lending restrictions in our sample period as well as a pronounced stock market boom-bust cycle, the
omission of stock price related variables in this study likely does not alter results considerably.
98
Table 3.6: Treated firm characteristics in t-1 by sets of covariates
Balance sheet All variables p > t
X¯ X¯
Growth (t+12)
∆Empl -1.1% -0.4% 0.45
t-1
Size and growth
log(Empl) 5.3 5.4 0.53
∆Empl 2.7% 1.8% 0.56
Balance sheet data
Equity / Assets 35.0% 35.7% 0.75
ROA -7.5% -7.8% 0.95
Fixed Assets / Assets 36.7% 36.1% 0.76
Coverage ratio 43.2 52.1 0.81
Cash / Assets 10.1% 9.9% 0.87
Currrent situation
State (+) 21.2% 21.0% 0.96
State (-) 29.8% 28.0% 0.72
Orders (+) 10.1% 10.2% 0.98
Orders (-) 43.4% 40.8% 0.61
Short-time 15.7% 9.6% 0.09
Export 88.4% 91.7% 0.30
Expectations
Business expect (+) 15.7% 15.3% 0.92
Business expect (-) 28.3% 26.8% 0.75
Empl expect (+) 5.1% 3.8% 0.58
Empl expect (-) 24.2% 21.0% 0.47
Short-time expect 22.2% 17.8% 0.31
Hcount (-) 29.8% 26.8% 0.53
Hcount (+) 5.6% 5.1% 0.85
Notes: For the samples selected by the radius matching, the table compares the means of all
covariates in t-1 for the treated firms between the matching on size, growth, and balance sheet
variables and the matching on all variables; p-values are provided for a two-group mean compar-
ison test; no adjustment for multiple testing.
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of the matching firms. Table 3.6 reports the results for the radius matching.14 Based on
standard t-tests, we find no substantial differences in pre-treatment firm characteristics
between the two samples. More specifically, out of twenty mean comparison tests only the
one for the short-time work status indicates a statistically significant difference at the ten
percent level. However, the expectations to work short-time within the next three months
are fairly balanced. The sample comparison suggests that differences in the estimated
supply-side effects of restrictive bank lending are rather driven by a reduction in selection
bias and less likely caused by sample selection. Furthermore, similar but unreported com-
parisons of the treated firms in the sub-samples selected by the procedures with the total
population of treated firms in the unmatched sample also indicates the representativeness
of the selected sub-samples.
3.6.2 Remaining extreme values
We deal with extreme values in ∆Empli,t+12 and in the balance sheet variables using two
approaches in Section 3.5.2. To ensure that the results are not driven by remaining outliers
in ∆Empli,t+12, we also estimate the treatment effect of Restrictedi,t on the probability of
having a positive employment growth rate, indicated by the dummy variable Growthi,t+12,
which is unaffected by extreme levels in growth rates. According to Panel A of Table
3.7, the estimated effects of bank-side factors are statistically significant and fairly stable
across matching algorithms. If taking into account firms’ current business situations and
future expectations, however, the effect drops to almost zero and turns insignificant. Again,
estimates in Panel B are outside the 90 percent confidence intervals of estimates in Panel A.
This confirms our finding of substantial bias in the estimated effects of supply-side-driven
bank lending restrictions bank-side factors if firms’ current business situations and future
expectations are not accounted for, even if we use a measure that is not susceptible to
extreme values.
3.7 The role of the financial crisis
In the sample period ranging from 2003 to 2011, the variation in reported bank lending
restrictions is largely driven by the financial crisis of 2007/08 (see Figure 3.1). This might
affect the extent to which selection bias arises from omitting timely indicators of firms’
14Sample comparisons for the nearest neighbors and kernel matching also do not show considerable
differences, but are not shown for the sake of conciseness.
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Table 3.7: ATT on dichotomous Growthi,t+12
Panel A: Matching on size, growth, and balance sheet data only
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -9.05% -9.19% -10.22%
S.E. (0.0255) (0.0244) (0.0219)
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Upper bound -4.86% -5.17% -6.62%
Lower bound -13.24% -13.21% -13.83%
# of treated 207 185 197
# of matchings 1260 1427 1789
Panel B: Matching on all variables
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT 2.48% -2.00% 0.46%
S.E. (0.0301) (0.0313) (0.0283)
P-value 0.41 0.52 0.87
# of treated 153 124 138
# of matchings 882 845 1048
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the treatment Restrictedi,t
on the dummy variable Growthi,t+12 based on weighted least squares estimation; in Panel A weights are
derived from matching firms based on size, growth, and balance sheet data in t-1; upper and lower bounds
are reported for 90 percent confidence intervals; in Panel B weights are derived from matching firms based
on size, growth, balance sheet data, and their current business situations and future expectations in t-1;
to account for extreme values, observations with a delta deviance influence statistic larger than three are
omitted; p-values are reported for a t-test of significance of the ATT.
current states and future prospects for two reasons. First, firms were operating under
exceptional conditions and uncertainty about the future macroeconomic environment was
high. Therefore, balance sheet data, which are backward looking in nature, became less in-
formative for banks to assess firms’ creditworthiness. Under these circumstances we would
expect banks to put more weight on contemporaneous and forward-looking firm character-
istics. Second, the economic downturn as well as high levels of uncertainty following the
financial crisis brought down firms’ credit demand considerably. The omission of timely
contemporaneous or even forward-looking indicators of firm-specific credit demand is thus
particularly likely to induce considerable bias in the time period under consideration.
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Splitting our sample in a pre-crises and a crisis sub-sample in order to study structural
differences, however, is prohibited by the low number of treatments observed in the pre-
crisis period. Defining the second quarter of 2007 as the end of the pre-crisis period would
leave us with about 100 treated firm-month observations in the corresponding sub-sample.
As a result of the curse of dimensionality issue arising from matching firms within quarter-
industry cells, the insufficient number of less than 30 treated firm-month observations can
be utilized to draw inference on the pre-crisis sub-sample.15 In consequence, we have to
admit that our results are representative for the crisis but possibly not for the pre-crisis
period.
Showing the robustness of our results for the crises sub-sample might be reassuring,
however. According to Tables 3.A.3 and 3.A.4 in the appendix, controlling for firms’
current business situations and future expectations lowers the estimated treatment effect
of restrictive bank lending on employment growth rates as well as the probability of firms
growing significantly in the crisis sub-sample. Whether there is a difference compared to
non-crisis periods, however, remains an open question to be answered by future research
when more data is available.
3.8 Conclusion
The effectiveness and efficiency of policy responses towards recessions and credit slumps
crucially depends on the understanding of to what extent credit market outcomes are driven
by supply-side or demand-side factors. If under-capitalized banks are a burden on the
economy, government intervention may well be justified. However, if on the contrary growth
is hampered by firm-side factors (e.g. by subdued expectations or low creditworthiness)
and credit volumes go down in response to weak credit demand or higher default risk,
government interventions should not necessarily aim at banks.
The empirical analysis of the effects of supply-driven changes in bank lending restrictions
on real economic activity is complicated by the need to rule out demand-side factors.
On the firm-level, the existing literature primarily does so based on firms’ balance sheet
information. Balance sheets, however, are published on a low frequency and are backward-
looking in nature. In particular, they contain little information on firms’ expectations. In
15We split the sample according to Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), who date the peak of the credit
boom in the U.S., which was followed by a meltdown of sub-prime mortgages and securitized products, to
the second quarter of 2007. In Germany, the first crisis related bank failure occurred at the end of July
2007 when the IKB (Deutsche Industriebank AG) was bailed out.
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this study, we observe firms’ self-perceived bank lending restrictions on an almost monthly
frequency and ask the question of whether controlling for similarly high-frequent survey-
based indicators of firms current states and future prospects in addition to balance sheet
information impacts the inference on identified treatment effects.
We employ a panel data of German manufacturing firms in which bank lending restric-
tions are mainly driven by the 2007/08 financial crisis. At the beginning of our analysis,
we estimate the effect of restrictive bank lending on firm-level employment growth using
a matching estimator based on balance sheet variables only. The results suggest a signif-
icant supply-driven effect of bank lending restrictions on firm-level employment growth.
However, this effect is not confirmed once we control for survey-based appraisals of firms’
current business situations and future expectations. Specifically, treatment effects turn
out to be significantly lower while balancing properties improve considerably. In contrast,
balancing properties are poor in the case of matching on balance sheet variables only, re-
vealing significant bias from unbalanced contemporaneous and forward-looking firm-specific
indicators. Finally, robustness exercises confirm that our results hold irrespective of the
matching algorithm or the adjustment of extreme values in employment growth rates and
balance sheet variables.
Our findings indicate that estimates of firm-level effects of bank lending restrictions
are sensitive to the incorporation of contemporaneous and forward-looking information on
firms’ credit demand. Indeed, their omission may cause considerable bias. For this reason,
our results ask researchers to cautiously infer on the effects of bank lending restrictions if
they rely on balance sheet information only.
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Appendix
Table 3.A.1: Ordinary least squares estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Restricted -0.0108* -0.0121** -0.0118** -0.0085
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Size and growth No Yes Yes Yes
Balance sheet data No No Yes Yes
Current situation No No No Yes
Future expectations No No No Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0625 0.0943 0.1016 0.1601
N 5068 5068 5068 5068
Notes: The table shows least squares estimations of ∆Empli,t+12 on the treatment
status, Restrictedi,t, and different sets of pre-treatment control variables, Xi,t−1;
all non-dichotomous variables are winsorized by five percent at both tails of the
distribution; standard errors are clustered at the firm-level; “Size and growth”,
“Balance sheet data”, “Current situation”, and “Future expectations” are sets of
control variables as listed in Table 3.1; the four samples contain only observations
for which all control variables of Estimation (4) are available in t-1; * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.A.2: ATT on ∆Empli,t+12 with alternative outlier adjustment
Panel A: Matching on size, growth, and balance sheet data only
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -1.62% -1.91% -2.04%
S.E. (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0041)
P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000
Upper bound -0.83% -1.14% -1.38%
Lower bound -2.42% -2.68% -2.71%
# of treated 198 173 190
# of matchings 1231 1392 1846
Panel B: Matching on all variables
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -0.35% -0.05% -0.06%
S.E. (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0050)
P-value 0.51 0.92 0.89
# of treated 173 143 157
# of matchings 1102 985 1312
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the
treatment Restrictedi,t on the year-on-year employment growth rate ∆Empli,t+12
based on weighted least squares estimation; in Panel A weights are derived from
matching firms based on size, growth and balance sheet data in t-1; upper and lower
bounds are reported for the 90 percent confidence interval; in Panel B weights are
derived from matching firms based on size, growth, and balance sheet data as well
as on their current business situations and future expectations in t-1; to account
for extreme values, we winsorize five percent of the observations in ∆Empli,t+12
and all non-dichotomous variables from both sides of the distribution; p-values are
reported for a t-test of significance of the ATT.
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Table 3.A.3: ATT on ∆Emplit+12 after 2007Q2
Panel A: Matching on size, growth, and balance sheet data only
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -1.50% -2.33% -2.13%
S.E. (0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0048)
P-value 0.009 0.000 0.000
Upper bound -0.55% -1.45% -1.34%
Lower bound -2.44% -3.20% -2.91%
# of treated 151 138 148
# of matchings 922 1132 1425
Panel B: Matching on all variables
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -0.34% -0.81% -0.91%
S.E. (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0046)
P-value 0.51 0.12 0.05
# of treated 126 114 121
# of matchings 796 867 1092
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of treat-
ment Restrictedi,t on year-on-year employment growth rate ∆Empli,t+12 based on
weighted least squares estimation; in Panel A weights are derived from matching
firms based on size, growth, and balance sheet data in t-1; upper and lower bounds
are reported for the 90 percent confidence interval; in Panel B weights are derived
from matching firms based on size, growth, balance sheet data, and their current
business situations and future expectations in t-1; p-values are reported for a t-test
of significance of the ATT.
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Table 3.A.4: ATT on dichotomous Growthit+12 after 2007Q2
Panel A: Matching on size, growth, and balance sheet data only
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -7.70% -8.69% -7.96%
S.E. (0.0288) (0.0271) (0.0242)
P-value 0.008 0.001 0.001
Upper bound -2.96% -4.22% -3.99%
Lower bound -12.44% -13.14% -11.93%
# of treated 161 144 156
# of matchings 991 1174 1491
Panel B: Matching on all variables
NN 10 Radius Kernel
ATT -1.27% -3.59% -5.05%
S.E. (0.0309) (0.0302) (0.0272)
P-value 0.68 0.24 0.06
# of treated 140 123 132
# of matchings 865 925 1159
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of
treatment Restrictedi,t on on the dummy variable Growthi,t+12 based on weighted
least squares estimation; in Panel A weights are derived from matching firms based
on size, growth, and balance sheet data in t-1; upper and lower bounds are reported
for the 90 percent confidence interval; in Panel B weights are derived from matching
firms based on size, growth, balance sheet data, and their current business situations
and future expectations in t-1; p-values are reported for a t-test of significance of
the ATT.
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